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No matter how thoroughly the law of a particular jurisdiction is
overhauled and changed to conform with modern conditions, it must
still face the difficulty that political boundaries are not coincident with
economic boundaries. For the sovereign states of our nation this diffi-
culty was partly removed by the adoption of the United States Con-
stitution. The jurisdiction of the United States within the territory
of the state over interstate and foreign commerce does much to make
the nation a legal unit as well as an economic unit, but many interstate
transactions are not commerce and fall outside Federal control, or
although commerce are somewhat subject to state action. While our
present governmental machinery is adequately adapted for preventing
state interference with national powers, or vice versa, a serious and
little discussed difficulty is the absence of machinery to adjust clashes
and secure co-operation among the states. Thus, nothing in the Con-
stitution prevents Massachusetts from taxing the income of New
Jersey state bonds though the United States probably cannot tax
them. This typifies the odd situation of forty-eight partially sovereign
states regulating economic forces whose natural operations disregard
state lines. Other examples are furnished by the inability of the six
New England states to adopt a uniform railroad policy; the obstacles
to interstate rendition of deserting husbands; the want of reciprocity
between states as to automobile licenses; the duplication and triplica-
tion of state inheritance taxes on the same securities, when justice and
a healthy attitude toward fresh capital require the levy of a single tax
which should be distributed among the states concerned in a ratio
roughly based on their respective interests.
It is true that state lines have grown somewhat fainter during the
25 [685]
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last century and that some writers think that our states will eventually
be superseded by large administrative areas similar to the regional divi-
sions of the Federal Reserve System." Yet, whatever the unifying ten-
dencies in other fields, for purposes of legislation and judicial decisions
each state remains almost a law unto itself. The action of its courts
upon the citizens of another state is indeed restricted by the jurisdiction
of the United States courts for diversity of citizenship, the full faith
and credit clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, but these do not suffice to secure certainty and
justice. Our system of forty-eight water-tight legal compartments
within the nation (not to mention nine Federal circuits and the Dis-
trict of Columbia), creates more frequent problems of conflict of laws2
than arise between the various countries of Europe, because with us no
national jealousies hinder the flow of business and population from one
state to another. Bryce has remarked that a very large portion of our
citizens live in a state different from that in which they were born, and
this fact, as well as the vast extent of interstate business relations,
brings before our courts a large number of controversies involving the
application of the law of more than one state. Even the enactment of
a Uniform Law may not terminate the conflicting decisions of state
courts on commercial or other interstate transactions, but may merely
lead to inconsistent interpretations of the same section of such a law.
An additional bad result of interstate legal barriers is the frequent dif-
ficulty of getting all the parties to an interstate controversy into a single
court, either state or Federal, which has the power to compel the settle-
ment of the disputes, and one phase of this situation is the subject of
this article.
Interpleadet is a type-of judicial proceeding admirably fitted to
achieve justice in complicated controversies. A previous article in this
JOURNAL. has discussed the unfortunate technicalities which have sprung
up to lessen the usefulness of interpleader, and the possibility that they
will be removed in the near future. Yet even if interpleader be modern-
ized so that complete relief from multiple vexation may be given in a
controversy between citizens of the same state, the law will remain
unsatisfactory unless a stakeholder may obtain the same protection
when one or more of the claimants lives in a different state from him-
'See Laski, The, Problem of Sovereignty (1917) 267-285; Foundations of
Sovereignty. (1921) 30, the chapter on "The Problem of Administrative Areas."
Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization
for Improvement of the Law, proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute (923) 85.
'Modernizing Interpleader (I921) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 814. The writer
takes advantage of this opportunity to call attention to two oversights in his proof-
correction of this article. Page 823, line 6 from bottom of text, insert "not"
before "be possible." Page 834, lines 5 and 6 from bottom of text, omit "of
bailees" and also omit the words in this sentence following "etc.," so that the last
part of the sentence will read: "the boarding-house case, the tax cases, etc."
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self. It is the purpose of this article to examine the present limitations
upon such interstate interpleader.
In order to give complete relief to the applicant who seeks inter-
pleader, the court must have the power to enjoin the claimants from
prosecuting their claims outside of the interpleader proceeding, for
otherwise its decree would not terminate the controversy. If actions
against the applicant are already pending in the courts of another state,
or if one or more claimants cannot be brought within the jurisdiction
of the court which is asked to compel them to interplead, serious difficul-
ties arise.
Let us suppose that a stakeholder, A, is threatened with litigation by
two claimants C. and C.; that both claims relate *to the same res; and
that while A and C. both reside in state X, C, resides in state Y. It
may be that A is a savings bank, and that the deposit made by a decedent
is claimed by both the administrator and an alleged donee inter vivos
of the savings-bank book; or that A is an interstate railroad from which
freight is claimed by the consignee and a person who states that the
goods were stolen from him by the consignor; or that A is an insurance
company and the proceeds of the policy are claimed by the administra-
tor of the original poljcy holder and an alleged assignee, or perhaps
by an administrator of the beneficiary who predeceased the policy holder.
In all these situations and many others, it frequently happens that the
claimants live in different states. If they were citizens of the same state
with the applicant, interpleader would be his natural remedy. He would
put the res into court, and both claimants could be summoned in to settle
to which it should be awarded. But in the case supposed, whether A
brings interpleader in X or in Y, one of the claimants is necessarily a
non-resident with respect to the forum. Suppose he sues in X, and C2
though notified, refuses to appear. Is this want of personal jurisdiction
over C2 a fatal bar to the relief sought?
I
It will be worth while for us to begin by examining the decisions in
England and the other jurisdictions of the British Empire before we
take up the cases in the United States, which are somewhat complicated
by constitutional factors that do not exist elsewhere.
Jurisdiction to grant interpleader against non-residents is supported
by the powerful authority of Lord Eldon. In Stevenson v. Anderson,
4
decided in .1814, the applicant in England held bills of exchange for
collection. They were claimed by three sets of claimants, one of whom
resided in England, and the other two in Scotland. An action of trover
had been brought in England and garnishment proceedings in Scotland.
4 (Ch.) 2 Ves. & Bea. 407. The statement at the end of the report that the
motion was granted, if it refers to the motion for the discharge of the injunction,
must be erroneous, for the injunction was obviously continued.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The applicant prayed that all the claimants should interplead. The
Vice-Chancellor granted an injunction, and the English claimant, who
alone had appeared, demurred for want of equity-and moved that the
order be discharged. Lord Eldon continued the injunction for the
following reasons:5
"It was objected, that the Goodalls and the attaching creditors are
out of the jurisdiction; and, as there is only one creditor within the
jurisdiction, a bill of interpleader cannot be filed. Upon the authori-
ties, that proposition cannot be maintained; as a person, out of the
jurisdiction, may threaten, and bring, an action; and, though he should
never come within the jurisdiction, there is a familiar mode of conclud-
ing him. The plaintiff is bound to bring all persons into the field to con-
tend together. That rests upon him. I have had occasion to consider
that with reference to persons, not residing in Scotland, but foreigners;
and the opinion I formed upon it, without any difficulty, or the aid of
a precedent, which I could not find, though there is precedent enough of
willing Defendants, is that the plaintiff in a bill of interpleader against
persons within and without the jurisdiction is bound to bring them all
within the jurisdiction in a reasonable time; if he does not, the conse-
quence is, that the only person within' the jurisdiction must have that
which is represented to be the subject of competition; and the plaintiff
must be indemnified against those who are out of the jurisdiction, when
they think proper to come within it, and sue either at Law or in this
Court. If the Plaintiff can show he has used all due diligence to bring
persons, out of the jurisdiction, to contend with those who are within
it, and they will not come, the Court, upon that default, and their so
abstaining from giving him the opportunity of relieving himself, would,
if they afterwards came here and brought an action, order service on
their Attorney to be good service, and enjoin that action forever; not
permitting those, who refused the Plaintiff that justice, to commit that
injustice against him."
It is necessary to distinguish carefully three problems, which are
raised in this case and other similar situations:
(i) Should the court, instead of dismissing the bill or motion for
interpleader, order notice to be served upon the non-resident claimant,
with the hope that he will be induced to appear and contest?
(2) If, however, he fails to appear, should the court of state X (the
forum) enjoin the non-resident from afterwards suing the applicant
in the courts of X, award the res to the domestic claimant if his ex parte
case seems good, and leave the non-resident, if he subsequently comes
into X, to proceed against the domestic claimant?
(3) May the court of X also enjoin the absent non-resident from
suing the applicant outside of X by a decree which will be recognized
as a valid bar to such an action in the claimant's own state (Y) and
in foreign courts? For example, in Stevenson v. Anderson could




courts as a defense if one of the Scotch claimants should sue the
applicant there?
Consider these three problems in the light of the cases in England
and the Dominions.
(I) The first question may be safely answered in the affirmative.
The court ought to go at least this far. It is true that if the other two
questions are answered in the negative, the non-resident C2 may prefer
to remain aloof from a contest in equity with C1, the domestic claimant,
and take his chances in a subsequent jury trial in an action against the
applicant in state Y, or even in X. On the other hand, there is a reason-
ably good possibility that he will respond to the notice and appear. If
he wins the second stage of the interpleader, the res is in court ready for
him, while if he insists on an action at law, he will have to enforce his
judgment by execution against the applicant's property, which may be
hard to reach. This consideration possesses special force if the res
is a chattel physically located in state X, or if it is a debt which could
not easily be collected in an action outside of X. For example, if the
applicant is a savings-bank, and the res a deposit, it would be hard to
find property of the bank outside the state where it does business. Fur-
thermore there is no injustice to the claimants.if the bill is retained long
enough to ascertain whether the non-resident will come in, and no
longer. If he refuses to respond to the notice and the bill is then dis-
missed, he suffers no harm. As for the domestic claimant, C1, his
action at law is temporarily enjoined until it becomes clear that the
notice will be ineffective, and afterwards allowed to proceed as if noth-
ing had happened.
Consequently, service of notice on the non-resident claimant is per-
mitted in interpleader both in England and the other courts of the
British Empire. The decision of Lord Eldon has been followed, at
least to this extent, by later English judges. The leading modern case is
Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede 7 in which service was permitted
on the non-resident Spanish shipper of goods, held in England by a
bailee, who had been sued by an English firm under an alleged assign-
ment from the shipper. The Spaniard had threatened to sue in Eng-
land, and had not yet come into the jurisdiction. However, the English
courts regard the practice as peculiar to interpleader, and refuse to
S(1884) L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 171. Mathews, J., refused to issue a summons
upon the Spaniard, bn the ground that the court would have no authority to enforce
any order which might be made against a non-resident foreigner, but was reversed
by Pollock, B., and Lopes, J. Accord: Stevenson i'. Anderson, supra note 4;
MJartinius v. Helmuth (1817, Ch.) 2 Ves. & Bea. 412, note, s. c. (1814, Ch.) Coop.
t. Eld. 245; East & West India Dock Co. v. Littledale (1848, Eq.) 7 Hare, 57;
Attenborough v. London & St. Katherine's Dock Co. (1878) L. R. 3 C. P. Div.
45o-the report indicates that the non-resident responded to the summons; Ber-
monte 'v. Aynard (879) 4 L. R. C. P. Div. 22x; s. c. (1879, C. A.) ibid. 352--
same indication; Van der Kun v. Ashworth (1884, Q. B.) W. N. 58. Contra:
Pat6rni v. Campbell (1843, Excb.) 12 M. & W. 277 (semble).
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extend it to other types of proceedings.8 Even for interpleader, the
effect of the summons will be narrowly limited.' In Ireland
° service
on a non-resident will be authorized for purposes of notice only, and
the Canadian and Scotch courts:" probably go at least as far. In Canada,
8 Weldon v. Gounod (1885) L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 622. The plaintiff obtained a
judgment against a non-resident foreigner, and applied for the appointment of a
receiver of certain money which it was alleged was about to be paid for the
defendant. The plaintiff's motion for service of a summons on the defendant
abroad was denied. See the comments of Coleridge, C. J., and Smith, J., on
Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede, supra note 7, emphasizing the fact that
there the non-resident was coming within the jurisdiction to enforce a claim, so
that it was desirable to anticipate him so that he might employ a proper method
for determining the validity of his claim.
In re Buslield (1886, C. A.) L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 123. A residuary legatee took
out an originating summons for an accounting by the executors and trustees, and
applied for leave to serve the summons on one defendant who, though English,
was temporarily resident in France. The application was refused because such
service was unauthorized by the Rules of the Supreme Court for an originating
summons, but it would have been authorized if the action had been begun by writ
of summons the proceedings under which are in court whereas under an originating
summons they are in chambers. Cotton, L. J., said at p. 132: "Credits Gerundeuse
v. Van Weede was a case of interpleader, and the decision may perhaps be
supported on the ground that the object of service was not to give jurisdiction over
the party served, but only to give him notice of a proceeding affecting his rights,
that he might if he pleased come in and defend them, and it is on this that Baron
Pollock rests his judgment."
In re La Compagnie Ginirale d'Eaux Min&ales et de Bains de Mer [i89i] 3
Ch. 451. An originating notice of a motion to remove the non-resident company's
trademark from the register was served upon the company abroad without leave
of court. The service was set aside as an abuse of process on the authority of
In re Busfield, but a proceeding in rein was allowed to be directed against the
Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, of which notice was to
be given the non-resident company.
See also Western National Bank of the City of New York v. Perez, Triana &
Co. [i8gi, C. A.] i Q. B. 304, non-resident alien firm not bound by service on
partner temporarily in England, but only that partner; quoted infra note 24; EX
parte Brandon (1886, Q. B.) 54 L. T. (x. s.) i28; In re Cliff [1894] 2 Ch. 21.
I Eschger & Co. v. Morrison (x89o, C. A.) 6 T. L. R. 145. The non-resident
claimant apparently appeared in response to the interpleader summons. The
domestic claimant wished to counterclaim in the second stage with respect to another
transaction, but leave to do so was refused. For cases allowing resident claimants
to settle disputes disconnected from the res in the second stage, see Something of
Interest with Regard to the Remedy by Interpleader (i9o8) 66 CEr. L. JoUR. lO7.
" Keane v. Crozier (1893, Q. B.) 27 Ir. L. T. 81; City of Dublin Packet Co. v.
Cooper [1899, Q. B.] 2 Ir. 381 ; Galabrun v. Bruce, Synmes & Williams [1903,
K. B.] 2 Ir. 458, giving form of order for service. Cf. Spence v. Parkes [1900,
Q. B.] 2 Ir. 61g, intervention, but not true interpleader.
Buffalo & Lake Huron Ry. v. Hemmingway (1863) 22 Upper Canada Q. B.
562; Re Confederation Life Assoc. (1899, Div. Ct.) ig Ont. Pr. -6, (19oo, 
C. A.)
19 Ont. Pr. 89; see Re Underfeed Stoker Co. of America (i9Ol, Master in
Chambers) I Ont. L. 42; cf. the second paragraph of note 26, inffra.; contra: Re
Mutual Life (1899, Nova Scotia, in Chambers) 1g Can. L. T. 362. Scotland:
No. British Ry. v. White (1881, Ct. of Sess.) 9 Sess. Cas. (4th series) 97; cf. note
41, infra.
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however, interpleader will be refused altogether to a resident debtor if
the debt is payable elsewhere, especially if the claimants reside at the
place of payment. The court considers in such a situation that there
is no res within the jurisdiction.1 2
(2) The actual decision in Stevenson v. AndersonY involved only
an answer to the first question. The report does not show what hap-
pened after the demurrer was overruled and the applicant told to bring
the Scotch claimants in if he could. 'We do not know whether they
failed to appear, and if so, whether Lord Eldon carried out his threat
to award the res to the home claimant and to enjoin the Scotch claimants
from subsequently suing the applicant. Indeed, the question could be
decisively settled only if after such an injunction the Scotch claimants
did sue and were held to be barred. But Eldon's reasoning leaves no
doubt that he would have so held. In the same way, the actual decision
in Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede'4 is expressly limited to
authorizing the issue of the summons on Jordi, the non-resident. But
there is a dictum by Pollock, which, though not entirely consistent, indi-
cates that if the non-resident should not come into the interpleader, he
would be barred from bringing subsequent proceedings in England :15
".. .. It is one of the first principles of all judicature that, wherever
there is a dispute as to the right to property or its value, all the parties
interested therein should be before the Court, in order that the matter
may if possible be finally settled and complete justice be done.
"Now in the present case the Court by making the order asked for,
does not assert any present jurisdiction over Jordi, or propose to compel
him to submit to its process, but merely gives him notice of the pro-
ceedings which are being taken; so that if after such notice he should
decline to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, and allow the rights
as between the plaintiffs and defendant to be determined in his absence,
and hereafter commence an action against the defendant in respect of
the identical claim now made by the plaintiffs, he may be barred from
continuing proceedings which would be harassing upon the defendant,
who would thereby be twice vexed for the same cause. If Jordi has
a good claim, as he asserts, against the defendant, he is not put in a
worse position by prosecuting it now instead of waiting till the action
by the defendant is determined."
Thus it may be assumed that the second question would be answered
in the affirmative in England,16 although the point has never been
"Re Benfield and Stevens (1896, Master in Chambers) 17 Ont. Pr. 300, 339;
Harris v. Bank of British North America (igoo, Div. Ct.) 19 Ont. Pr. 5,; both
stated in the second paragraph of note 26, infra, with analogous references.
"Supra note 4; see p. 687, supra.
,Supra note 7t at pp. 173, 175; see p. 689, supra.
' Ibid. 173. Contra: Patorni v. Campbell, supra note 7 (semble). The other
English interpleader cases leave the point uncertain.
1 It is significant that in Martinius v. Helmuth, supra note 7, Lord Eldon
followed Stevenson v. Anderson, supra note 4, so far as to award the res (insur-
ance money) to the home claimant and pass on the question of costs. This could
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actually decided and although later cases 17 have somewhat doubted
Pollock's dictum and show a disposition to limit the effect of his deci-
sion to the authorization of the issue of the summons. The Irish
courts, however, would probably answer the second question in the
negative if an original bill of interpleader was brought, and dismiss the
bill should the non-resident fail to respond to the summons,'8 but a
different result might be reached if the intertleader was sought by
motion in an action at law brought by the home claimant against the
applicant.'9 The only Scotch case discovered leaves the question in
doubt.2 0  In Canada interpleader would probably be allowed, 2' if the
res was considered to be in the jurisdiction.
On grounds of practical convenience, much may be said for the
solution of our problem which was reached by Eldon and Pollock. If
the non-resident does not come in after receiving notice, it is his own
fault and he is in a poor position to complain if he is later refused
the chance to assert his rights against the applicant in the forum whose
request he had previously disregarded and if the res has been awarded
to the home claimant in the second stage of the interpleader proceed-
ings from which he deliberately absented himself. Such a victory by
the home claimant is automatic, under Eldon's view, and is highly
probable in any event since only his side of the controversy is presented
to the court. It may be that this claimant is still subject to proceedings
by the non-resident if the latter subsequently chooses to come into
the forum and sue him-neither Eldon nor Pollock is quite clear on
this-but the applicant, having done all in his power to settle a con-
troversy in which he was unexpectedly entangled, is protected from
further litigation in this forum both by the injunction and by the
indemnity given him by the home claimant.
Nevertheless, even if we leave theoretical questions of jurisdiction
aside for the moment, the question is by no means clear as a matter of
concrete justice. What sort of service on a non-resident is necessary
to bar him? Must he actually learn of the pending interpleader, or is
it enough if the notice is mailed to his last-known address or even pub-
lished in a newspaper without ever reaching his eyes ?22 Moreover,
,not have been done if the bill was entertained merely until the non-resident failed
to appear. There is, however, no record that the latter was actually enjoined,
though Eldon said that he would be bound by the decree.
' See supra note 8, and text-writers quoted infra note 33.
's See Keane v. Crozier; City of Dublin Packet Co. v. Cooper; Spence v.
Parkes, all cited supra note io, and their criticism of Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v.
Van Wveede, supra note 7.
" See Galabrun v. Bruce, Syrnes & Willins, supra note Io; but the only point
actuilly decided was that non-resident service might be made.
"°Forbes v. Campbell (1845, Ct. of Sess.) 17 S-co. Jur. 552.
"See the cases in supra note ii and infra note 26.
See the form of order in Galabrun v. Bruce, Synmes & Williains, supra note io,
at p. 462, which directed a registered letter to the last-known address, Liege, and
publication in three newspapers, issued in Liege, Marseilles and London respec-
tively, and declared this to be good service.
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although it may be fair to ask a resident of Scotland or Belgium or
even Spain to appear in the courts of England. or Ireland at a time
specified, may the same remedy be rightfully used if he lives in Aus-
tralia, or India or the United States? And were the Scotch claimants
in Stevenson v. Andersoi 2 at fault if they preferred to try to enforce
their rights in the Court of Session before subjecting themselves to
technical English rules of evidence? Finally, if the third question is
answered in the negative, so that the English decree will not protect the
applicant from suits abroad (except for the indemnity bond), ought the
English court to try to protect him even in England? It may con-
ceivably be objectionable to do justice by halves, and better to keep
hands off entirely if interpleader will not close the controversy once and
for all. Too little consideration has been given by the English courts
to such objections and to the question of jurisdiction ;24 but Baron Parke
observed, 25 "There would be great difficulty, in the case where the claim-
ant is a foreigner, residing abroad, in doing justice between the parties";
and Baron Anderson agreed, saying, "I do not see what right we have
to bar a foreigner, resident out of the jurisdiction of the court."
(3) The third question, whether the interpleader decree bars a
foreign suit, must be deferred until we review the cases in the United
States, for it is not discussed by the English or Irish judges, and receives
See p. 687, supra.
The English and Irish cases turn largely on the construction of Acts of
Parliament and Rules of Court, with little discussion whether there is jurisdiction
in rem over the subject matter of interpleader. The reasons for this are suggested
by Esher, M. R., dissenting in Western National Bank of the City of New York v.
Perea, Triana & Co. [i8g, C. A.] I Q. B. 304, 311, 313, 314, service on partner
temporarily in England in suit against firm of non-resident foreigners:
"If the foreigner thus sued is not found in England, or, indeed, if an English
subject sued in England is not in England, the English laws of procedure could not
be exercised outside the territorial jurisdiction of England by an English Court,
unless the Court were authorized to do so by an Einglish Act of Parliament which
it was bound to obey.... Whether such enactment is strictly within international
comity is a question which no English Court can entertain. The order binds the
Court. The order is conclusive that, to the extent to which it goes, the Court
must exercise its jurisdiction over a foreigner neither resident nor domicilEd in
England...
"Again, it has been said, that no foreign Court would enforce in its own country
a judgment obtained in this country, procured under the rules and orders in the
manner above described.... But, supposing that the judgment would be ineffec-
tual abroad, it may well stand as a valid judgment in this country, effectual against
any partnership or personal property which may hereafter come into this country."
See also Middleton, J., McMulken v. Traders Bank of Canada (1912, Div. Ct.)
26 Ont. L. I, 6:
"Upon the argument, much was made of the difficulty that might in some cases
arise if the Courts of Ontario were to assume authority to take in execution a debt
of this kind, because, it was suggested, foreign Courts might not accord the judg-
ment of the Ontario Court any extra-territorial recognition. It is a sufficient
answer to this to point out that this is a question of policy, affecting those who
make the law, and that it cannot be considered by the Courts, who are called upon
to administer the law as they find it."
See note 28, infra.
IPatorni v. Campbell, supra note 7, at p. 279.
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only a passing mention in the Canadian decisions, 26 which intimate
that if the res is physically situated at the forum or is a debt payable
there, the interpleader decree would be a defense to actions elsewhere.
There is nothing comparable to our full faith and credit clause in the
British North American Act, but an interpleader decree given where
there is jurisdiction in rein according to the Canadian doctrine would
normally be enforced in another province on the principle of Castrique v.
Imrie."
A word of caution is, however, necessary. The fact that a judge
in England, Ireland, or Canada might grant interpleader against a
defaulting non-resident does not prove that the proceeding is in rem.
The judge may issue the summons and bar the alien from suing the
applicant in this particular forum because such procedure is ordered
by legislation which the court is bound to obey even though he considers
that the legislation is ordering something beyond the proper scope of
its territorial jurisdiction. The very same judge might refuse to recog-
nize a similar interpleader decree in another province or nation, on the
ground that interpleader was a proceeding in personam. The situation
would be parallel to Schibsby v. Westenhoz, 28 in which Lord Black-
'That the decree would be binding. Buffalo & L. H, Ry. v. Hemmingway,
supra note ii, at p. 567 (semble). For 'a suggestion contra, see McMulken v.
Traders Bank of Canada, a garnishment case, quoted supra note 24.
In Re Brunswick Balke Co. & Martin (I885, in Chambers) 3 Manitoba, 328, the
res was a chattel physically outside the jurisdiction and interpleader was denied
although all parties were before the court, one reason being that a decree would
not bar an action at law against the applicant at the situs. In Harris v. Bank of
British Ndrth America, supra not6 12, the debtor in Ontario was not allowed to
interplead a resident claimant who had sued in Ontario, and an English claimant
who had sued in England, on the grounds that the debt was not payable in Ontario
and this court could not stay the English suit or give a judgment which would
be a defense' thereto. Accord, Re Benjield and .Stevaena, supra note 12, where an
Ontario debtor was not allowed to interplead residents of the United States, on
the ground that the debt was payable there, so that there was no res at the forum,
distinguishing Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede, supra note 7, because the
res was there a chattel in England. See Holmested, loc. cit. note 33.
These cases indicate that if the res were a chattel at the forum or a debt payable
there, interpleader would be granted against a non-resident and might. possibly
bar a foreign suit. The interpleader cases in this country where the res is a debt
do not emphasize the place of payment. In a few garnishment cases this factor
was emphasized, Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Nash (1898) xi8 Ala. 477, 23
So. 825, but is now generally disregarded; Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In
Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HAmv. L. REv. 107, 117; also, 20
L. R. A. (N. s.) 264, note. Even in Canada, garnishment is valid though the debt
is not payable in the province where the garnishee is served. McMulken v.
Traders Bank of Canada, supra note 24.
(187o) L. R. 4 H. L. 414; the lower court opinions, (i86o, C. P.) 8 C. B. N. s.
I, and (i86o, Exch. Ch.) 8 C. B. N. s. 405 were followed in Burn v. Bletcher
(1863) 23 Upper Canada Q. B. 28, which was relied on in the interpleader case of
Buffalo & L. H. Ry. v. Hemmingway, supra note ii.
2 (i87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, 159. Blackburn, J.: "Should a foreigner be sued
under the provisions of [the Common Law Procedure Act], and then come to the
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burn dismissed a suit upon a French judgment against Danes residing
outside France, although conceding that an English statute would
oblige him to give exactly the same sort of judgment against aliens
residing outside England. But Parliament had left him free to consider
the French procedure on sound principles of Conflict of Laws, and the
absence of national power to bind the non-resident threw the case out
of court. Thus before we can infer an affirmative answer to our third
question from cases answering the second question affirmatively, we
must be sure whether this judicial disposition of the second question
is merely compelled by legislation or represents the court's opinion that
interpleader is within its territorial jurisdiction. Now it is more than
possible that Credits Gerumdeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede
29 and similar
Irish and Canadian cases of interpleader against non-residents are the
result of extra-jurisdictional statutes. Stevenson v. Anderson3
° is not
such a case for it was decided without statutory influence, but the other
decisions turn largely on the wording of Procedure Acts and Rules of
Court without much discussion of jurisdiction. And when the English
courts do feel free to inquire into jurisdiction as in Schibsby v. Westen-
holz,3 ' they law down tests which seem fatal to the extra-territorial
efficacy of interpleader decrees given without personal service. For
example, one of the strongest arguments in the United States for
jurisdiction in rem in interpleader where the res is a debt has been
found in the foreign garnishment cases, and it is consequently significant
that the House of Lords has refused to regard such garnishments as
valid32 except in a special class of cases. Even this argument, we shall
see, does not suffice to convince our courts in the interpleader cases;
and when it is lacking as in England, it would seem a fortiori that
interpleader requires personal jurisdiction over the claimants as well
as the applicant-debtor. Consequently, it is very doubtful .whether an
English court would afford recognition to an interpleader decree given
against a defaulting non-resident. And indeed several English text-
writers33 answer both our second and third questions in the negative,
courts of this country and desire to be discharged, the only question which our
courts could entertain would be whether the Acts of the British legislature, rightly
construed, gave us jurisdiction over this foreigner, for we must obey them." See
supra note 24; Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State (1923) 36 HARV. L.
REV. 241, 242.
= Supra note 7; see also cases in sapra notes ii and ig.
"Supra note 4.
, Supra note 28. And see cases in supra note 8.
"Mayor of London v. Cox (1867) L. R. 2 H. L. 239, 258. See Beale, op. cit.
supra note 26, at pp. 121, 122.
Merlin, The Law and Practice of Interpleader (i9o7) 3o: "Since [Re Busfield,
supra note 8] the practice of judges in chambers has been to refuse applications
for leave to serve interpleader summons out of the jurisdiction." But he thinks
that the authorities justify such service to inform the non-resident though not to
bind him.
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taking the view that Stevenson v. Anderson3' is no longer law and
that the statutes when properly construed do not order the courts to
bind an alien in interpleader. If this view be sound, the courts can, at
most, notify the alien to come in if he wishes, and interpleader is now
impossible in England unless all the claimants are either domiciled there
or consent to enter their appearance in the proceeding. Under the same
view, the Ontario statutes and rules of court perhaps compel an affirma-
tive answer to the second question, but the third must be answered in
the negative as in England.
II
In the United States, the Constitution influences the solution of our
problem in three ways. (a) The due process clause makes impossible
the peculiar situation described in the last paragraph, in which the
English courts are obliged to obey a statute conferring power to issue
process against non-residents although the judges consider that no
territorial jurisdiction exists. Our courts, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, are free to disregard legislation which violates the judicially
established principles of territorial jurisdiction. Possibly the privileges
and immunities clause (Art. IV, sec. 2) has a similar result.3 5 Thus
our second question is less likely to receive an affirmative answer in this
country than in the British Empire. (b) On the other hand, if an
affirmative answer be given to the second question, the full faith and
credit clause (Art. IV, sec. i) makes more probable an affirmative
answer to the third question. A state court cannot refuse to recognize
the valid judgment of another state for purposes of retaliation or for
more arbitrary reasons, although such refusal of recognition is entirely
possible between independent sovereignties."' (c) The diversity of citi-
Warde, The Practice of Interpleader by Sheriffs and High Bailiffs (2d ed. 19o4)
ooo: "Since Re Busfield, leave would probably not be given."
Piggott, Service out of the Jurisdiction (1892) 144-147: "It is exceedingly
difficult to reconcile [Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede, supra note 7] with
the fundamental principles already established.... The authorities therefore are
reduced to Lord Eldon's judgments in 1814: and it is with great submission sug-
gested that the Lord Chancellor's arguments are not in accordance with modern
learning on the subject of jurisdiction. They were given at a time when the
Chancery practice was a very vague and uncertain condition." This book contains
the best discussion of the English cases yet discovered; it concludes that nothing
more than a notice to the non-resident may properly be issued, and that there is no
statutory authority for more.
Contra: Maclennan, The Law of Interpleader (igoi) io7-7.io. He regards the
jurisdiction to bind the non-resident as settled in England and under the Ontario
statute. The same view is taken for Ontario by Holmested, The Judicature Act of
Ontario (4th ed. 1915) 1287.
'4'Supra note 4.
" See on this clause, Burdick, The Law of the Anerican Constitution (ig2)
ch. 24.
w Cf. Hilton v. Guyot (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, which refused to
give effect to a French judgment because a similar judgment in our courts would
not be recognized in France. See 2o L. R. A. 668, note'; 32 L. R. A. 236, note.
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zenship clause (Art. III, sec. 2) makes interpleader against the citizen
of another state easier than against the citizen of another nation.
Where the two claimants are citizens and residents of two wholly
independent sovereignties, no court exists which can possess personal
jurisdiction over both claimants.3 7  But if the two claimants reside
respectively in two states of the United States, a United States court
may conceivably be given by Congress personal jurisdiction over all
residents of the United States and so be able to bring both claimants
within reach of its process and decree.
This third factor of Federal jurisdiction will be discussed under a
later heading, and only the first two concern us for the moment. With
respect to the due process and full faith and credit clauses, it will be
observed, as Thomas Reed Powell acutely points out,38 that *although
the Constitution gives the courts powers which they might not otherwise
possess, the questions which the judges decide are not constitutional but
involve only Conflict of Laws. In other words, the Constitution does
not create any new principle of territorial jurisdiction. It is important
in the solution of our problem, first, because it enables our courts,
state as well as Federal, to set up their own views of the sound principles
of territorial jurisdiction in disregard of legislation which would restrict
an English court; and secondly, because it makes these questions of
jurisdiction to some extent Federal questions. It thus tends to prevent
the multiplication of conflicting judicial opinions on the validity of an
interpleader decree against non-residents by giving one court, the
Supreme Court of the United States, the final say in the matter, thus
producing a unification of the law much more complete than is possible
in the British Empire. 9
In our problem of interstate interpleader, the court in which relief
is sought has by hypothesis no personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
claimant, and consequently, its decree will, in the absence of jurisdic-
tion in rem, have no more effect upon him than words written on a
piece of paper by a private citizen. ° Therefore, so far as the state
"* Such a power might conceivably be given to a world court, but goes much
further than the compulsory adjudication of disputes between nations.
Taxation of Things in Transit (1920) 7 VA. L. REv. 167, 171, note.
"Some unification is, of course, possible through the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council. Its power is, however, much less complete than that of our
Supreme Court. It cannot review Scotch or English decisions; it cannot disre-
gard Colonial legislation of extra-territorial scope unless enforcement elsewhere
is involved; it may sanction a refusal to recognize the decree of another colony
for purposes of retaliation; appeals from Colonial Courts are only permissive and
a considerable sum of money must usually be involved.
' Griffith, C. J., Permanent Bldg. & Inv. Assoc. v. Hudson (1896, Sup. Ct.) 7
Queensland L. J. 23, 24; i Beale, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (19oo) 324, 325:
"Writs in New South Wales run as far as the border of New South Wales, and
no further.... The document served on him was only a piece of paper, to which,
in my opinion, he was in no way bound to pay attention, and which had no effect
in this colony, although in New South Wales it had ample effect but only because
the Legislature there had said so." For similar statements in interpleader cases
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courts at least are concerned, our problem turns upon the question
whether interpleader can properly be regarded as a proceeding in rem;
that is, first, whether the state in which interpleader is sought has terri-
torial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the controversy, and
secondly, whether the particular court has power to adjudicate the rights
in that subject-matter of persons who are not within the reach of its
process.
It sometimes happens that the court in which interpleader is brought
has undoubted jurisdiction in rem in both these senses. Thus, in Free-
land v. Wilson,41 an administrator in State X interpleaded two non-
residents, each of whom claimed a distributive share in the property
of a decedent in course of administration in X. Here there was a
definite fund within the state to confer territorial jurisdiction and the
claimants could not properly enforce their claim to this fund in any
other state. Furthermore, it is well settled that a court administering
a decedent's estate has power to bar claims which are not duly presented.
Consequently, the court could give complete relief to the administrator
regardless of its lack of personal jurisdiction over the claimant.
Let us suppose, however, that the res, although physically situated in
X, is not under administration. If the res is land there is territorial
jurisdiction. But since equity acts in personam, a statute will be neces-
sary to enable the court to determine the rights of the claimants without
personal jurisdiction over them. Statutes enabling equity to remove
clouds on title imposed by the claims of non-residents are frequent,4 2
but it is doubtful whether interpleader can be considered a proceeding
to remove cloud on title," since the applicant asserts no interest which
he wishes protected. However, a broader statute conferring jurisdic-
tion in rem where the interpleader concerns domestic land, would be a
see Spear, J., Cross v. Armstrong (1887) 44 Ohio St. 613, 627, io N. E. 16o;
Montgomery, J., Hinton v. Penn .Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1goo) 126 N. C. 18, 23, 35
S. E. 182. See also notes in 16 L. R. A. 231; 50 L. R. A. 577; 8 L. R. A. (N. s.)
538; 78 Am. St. Rep. 641; Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners
(1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 283, 286; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure (1922) 34.
•' (1853) 18 Mo. 380 (semble); see Cross v. Armstrong, supra note 40. Cf.
Forbes v. Campbell, supra note 20, where various persons in Scotland claimed to be
next-of-kin of a Bombay decedent. There was no Bombay administration, but the
Bombay Registrar allowed a banking-house to file a bond and transmit the funds
to Scotland. The banking-house there raised multiplepoinding (interpleader)
against the conflicting claimants, and asked that before the fund was paid to the
winning claimant he should give a bond of indemnity to protect the bank against
any liability it might incur on its Bombay bond. The court refused to impose this
burden of security ad aeternitatem, and said that the bank should have taken out
administration in Bombay. It will be noted that here there was no Scotch juris-
diction in rein over the decedent's estate, so that the decree could not bar all
possible claimants.
' See the Appendix of Statutes in Huston, The Enforcement of Decrees in
Equity (1915) ; U. S. Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. 1O87,
1102).
' Evans v. Scribners' Sons (1893, C. C. N. D. Ga.) 58 Fed. 3o3.
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simple matter.44  Now suppose that the res is a chattel physically situ-
ated in X. If it was brought there without the consent of the non-
resident claimant, it is doubtful whether his rights in the chattel can be
cut off unless he personally appears.4 5 If, however, the chattel is in
X by his consent, that State has territorial jurisdiction, and a statute
may give the court jurisdiction in rem which will make it possible to
bind non-residents by interpleader 9  as well as by other equitable
proceedings.
47
The foregoing reasoning makes interstate interpleader possible in
several situations where it is extremely useful. The bailee of a chattel
is frequently subject to double vexation especially if he is a carrier or
a warehouseman. In such situations the technical difficulties of privity,
which formerly prevented interpleader, have now been removed by the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act48 and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act.4 9  It would seem that a bailee may be given relief under these
statutes against a non-resident claimant in a state where the legislative
provisions for substituted service on non-residents are sufficiently broad
to apply to interpleader. (Whether the non-resident may then be barred
against the home claimant as well as against the applicant will be
considered later.)
Even where territorial jurisdiction exists because of the presence of
the chattel, it should not be exercised in a manner unfair to the non-
resident claimant. Thus, the order for substituted service should
specify that he be informed of the interpleader proceeding by a notice
"In Re Benfield and Stevens (1897, Master in Chambers) 17 Ont. Pr. 339, 341,
Street, J., in refusing interpleader as to royalties of an Ontario mine payable in
the United States where the chief claimants to the royalties resided, construed the
applicant's interest as a mere license, but said that if he had a lease of the mine at
a rent, jurisdiction might belong to the courts where the land was situated out of
which the rent was payable, to determine who should receive it.
"Edgerly v. Bush (188o) 8r N. Y. i99; Wylie v. Speyer (1881, N. Y. Sup. Ct.)
62 How. Pr. 1O7; see the conflicting views of the judges in Cammell v. Sewell
(I86o, Exch. Ch.) 5 H. & N. 728, 735, 745; also Einbiricos v. Anglo-Austrian
Bank [19o5, C. A.] i K. B. 677; and the comment on these cases by Chafee in
Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 11o4, 1143, note.
' Some of the English, Irish and Canadian cases which allowed interpleader may
perhaps be supported on the ground that the res was tangible personal property
within the jurisdiction, e. g., Credits Gerundeuse, Ltd. v. Van Weede, supra note
7; Galabrun v. Bruce, Symes & Williams, supra note io; Buffalo & Lake Huron
Ry. v. Hemningway, supra note ii. The decisions and text-writers criticizing
these cases adversely do not, however, point to this fact as sufficient justification
for binding the non-resident claimant.
"' Many of the statutes referred to in note 42 apply to personal as well as real
property, e. g. U. S. Judicial Code, sec. 57, Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L.
1O87, llO2). Jurisdiction to compel specific performance of a contract to sell a
ship was granted against a German in Hart v. Herwig (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 86o.
Sec. 2o.
Sec. 17; see Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
840, note 13.
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which actually reaches him, and not by publication in newspapers which
he may never read. And the court should, in its discretion, dismiss
the suit unless brought at a place where the non-resident may fairly
be asked to come. For example, the warehouseman may properly
require the claimant to assert his rights where the warehouse is situated.
The shipper or consignee ought not to be obliged to defend his title in
any state along the route which the carrier arbitrarily. selects as his
forum despite the existence of jurisdiction; and interpleader should be
denied unless the court be near the destination or the place of original
shipment or the point of stoppage in transitu. It must also be remem-
bered that if a negotiable warehouse receipt or bill-of-lading has been
issued and the appropriate Uniform Act is in force in all the states
concerned, the document of title now represents the goods, so that only
the situs of the document has jurisdiction in ren and interpleader must
be brought there in order to bind the non-resident who does not per-
sonally appear. He may fairly be required to keep himself informed
of the location of the document and be prepared to assert his rights
there.
Since no cases of interstate interpleader as to chattels have been found
in the United States it is not possible to test the validity of the foregoing
discussion by any authorities.
The most serious difficulties of interstate interpleader, however, arise
when the res is not land or a chattel but a debt. Certain kinds of debts
are represented by documents which may often be regarded as chattels,
and might perhaps be made the subject of interpleader in the state
where they are physically situated according to the principles already
discussed with respect to chattels. This view might be helpful in the
case of promissory notes, bills of exchange, and corporate bonds.50
But the debts which are most frequently the cause of double vexation
are savings bank deposits and life insurance. Although the pass book
issued by the savings bank is treated for some purposes as a chattel,5 '
it is doubtful if the debt is completely merged in the book. For exam-
ple, if the deposit is claimed by the administrator of the depositor and
a non-resident who alleges that the book was given to him by the deposi-
tor inter vivos, the most convenient forum for interpleader would be the
state in which the savings bank does business and the depositor resided.
The chattel view just suggested would make this impossible and would
5See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 45, at p. 1143, note; Wylie v. S'peyer, and
R-mbiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, supra note 45; Crichton v. Wingfield (1922)
258 U. S. 66, 42 Sup. Ct. 229. However, the only case discovered where interstate
interpleader was sought as to negotiable instruments denied relief, on the ground
that the proceeding was not in rem. Cleveland National Bank v. Burroughs
(1917) 1o Oh. App. 61.
' Scott, Cases on Trusts (i9i9) 165, note, gift of savings bank book; Warren,
Cases on Wills and Administration (1917) 839, note, gift inortis causa of such a
book.
INTERSTATE INTERPLEADER
oblige the bank to bring proceedings in the stateof the alleged donee,
possibly at the other end of the country. This would be not only incon-
venient to the bank but unfair to the administrator. He would have to
assert his claim in a forum depending on the accidental situs of the
book whereas the natural place for litigation is the location of the bank
which remains fixed. Of course the donee would argue that it is
equally hard on him to appear at a distance, but it seems much more
reasonable that he should expect to contest his claim in the state where
the deposit was made. No cases of interstate interpleader by savings
banks have been reported, but they have often been brought in Rhode
Island by savings banks doing business there, and the claimants are
usually willing to appear. Since the bank's state is not only the domicile
of the debtor but the only place provided by contract for the payment
of the debt, we have an argument for asserting a jurisdiction in rein
which does not exist for ordinary debts, and this argument is strength-
ened by the decision in Blackstone Z,. Miller,1 subsequently discussed.
And even if the state where the bank is situated does not have power
to grant interpleader, it would be so highly undesirable for the state
where the book is to possess jurisdiction in rem, that a holding to that
effect is very unlikely. Certainly the lex fori could not by its own
operation regard the book as embodying the deposit; the law of the
situs of the bank, where the contract 'of deposit was made, would
govern, and that law would probably not lay down such an inconvenient
rule.
A life insurance policy gives rise to a similar argument. A few
cases regard it as completely embodying the obligation of the insurance
company, so that the state where the policy is situated has jurisdiction
to determine the rights of non-residents therein.51  Only one inter-
pleader case, however, turns on this factor, 4 and several interpleader
and other cases55 do not recognize that the presence of the policy confers
(19o3) 188 U. S,. 189, 23 Sup. Ct 277; infra note 63.
'Perry v. Young (915) 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. W. 577; Morgan v. Mut. Ben.
Life Ins. Co. (1907) 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438; but see N. Y. cases in note 55;
Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. (19o8) 128 Ky. 799, IiO S. W. 265. In these cases
there was personal jurisdiction over the debtor and one claimant. See the doubts
expressed in McBride v. Garland (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 314, 316, 1O4 Atl. 435, 436;
Evans v. Scribners' Sons, supra note 43. That the situs of the policy was not at
the forum was one reason for refusal to recognize a decree adjudicating rights in
the insurance without jurisdiction over one claimant, in Gleason v. North Western
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1911) 203 N. Y. 507, 97 N. E. 35.
"Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., supra note 53.
In the following cases in which an interpleader decree was held not binding for
want of personal jurisdiction over a claimant, the decree was granted at the situs
of the policy: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (1916) 241 U. S. 518, 36 Sup.
Ct. 613. Gary v. North Western Mutual Aid Assoc. (1893) 87 Iowa, 25, 5o N. W.
27, 53 N. W. io86; Cross v. Armstrong, supra note 4o; Washington Life Ins.
Co. v. Gooding (1898) i9 Tex. Civ. App. 490, 49 S. W. 123.
In the following cases, a claimant was not allowed to have his right to insurance
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jurisdiction in -rem. The Federal Interpleader Act,
56 subsequently dis-
cussed, allows interpleader to be brought in the state where a beneficiary
resides and makes no mention of the location of the policy. Conse-
quently, the insurance cases must be discussed on the theory that the
res is a debt and not a chattel.
• If a debtor brings interpleader in his own state where one claimant
also resides, the vital question in dispute is whether the non-resident
claimant is the creditor. The forum has not personal jurisdiction over
both debtor and creditor as long as this question remains undecided.
Is it then possible for that forum to determine the ownership of the
debt without personal jurisdiction over both claimants? Two main
arguments may be advanced on behalf of the power of the debtor's
state to bind the non-resident claimant. (I) Personal jurisdiction over
the debtor confers jurisdiction in rem over the debt. (2) Even if such
jurisdiction does not arise from the presence or residence of the debtor
within the state, the payment by the applicant ol the amount of the
debt into court creates a fund over which it has jurisdiction in rem,
so that the claim of the non-resident against the applicant may be finally
adjudicated.
If these arguments can be sustained, one object of interpleader will
be accomplished, viz. the protection of the applicant from double vexa-
tion. Will it also be possible to attain the further result of protecting
the winning claimant from additional litigation by the loser, so as to
close the entire controversy by this one proceeding? Distinguish two
types of cases. First, the contest between the claimants may involve
not only the title to the res but also an alleged tort; e. g. C2, the non-
resident, asserts that C, has obtained the assignment of the insurance
policy from him by fraud. A court with jurisdiction in rem over the
obligation can settle the title to the policy, but cannot adjudicate the
personal question of fraud without actual service on C.. He cannot
Teclaim the policy from C1, but is free to sue him in deceit for its value
in this or another state. Consequently, the interstate interpleader can
not close the controversy. Secondly, the contest may involve nothing
but a question of title, as when the policy is claimed by the estate of the
insured and the estate of the beneficiary who predeceased the insured.
Here no tort or other personal dispute is left open. It may be sug-
gested that the award of the money to C1 might in itself create a con-
determined against an absent claimant although the policy and the company were
at the forum: Mahr v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Co. (1891) 127 N. Y. 452, 28 N. E.
391; Schoenholz v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (i92i, ist Dept.) 197 App. Div. 91, 188
N. Y. Supp. 596; affirmed without adjudication on jurisdiction (1922) 234 N. Y.
24, 136 N. E. 227. The New York cases are conflicting (see supra note 53) and
are probably affected by Hanna v. Stedman (1921) 230 N. Y. 326, 13o N. E. 566.
See also Fancher, J., dissenting, Perry v. Young, supra note 53, at p. 541, 182 S. W.
at p. 582.
"Act of Feb. 2, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. 929). See note 128.
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structive trust on behalf of C2 (in the opinion of another court) ; but
this is unsound, for such a right would have to be created by the law
of the place of the award, and that law pronounces the award rightful.
So C2 may be barred from afterwards suing both the company and C1.
However, it may be unwise to exercise the jurisdiction so as to bar C2
completely, and it is significant that in England when interpleader is
brought against two resident claimants (so that territorial jurisdiction
is clear), a claimant who fails to come in is barred against the applicant
but the order does not "affect the rights of the claimants as between
themselves. 5 Having thus demarcated the limits of jurisdiction in rem,
let us consider the two main arguments fo: the existence of such
jurisdiction.
(i) The first argument, that personal jurisdiction over the debtor
confers jurisdiction in rem over the debt, is a storm-center of contro-
versy. Forcible reasons have been urged for and against this doctrine.
58
It must suffice here to present the following extracts from authors who
contend that this doctrine should be applied in the determination of the
conflicting rights of citizens of different states to the proceeds of a life
insurance policy.
C. A. Huston, in his Enforcement of Dbcrees in Equity,59 points to
this situation as an illustration of his thesis that legislation is desirable
to enable decrees to operate in rem:
"The party seeking interpleader against two or more actual or pro-
spective claimants of the fund or other res which he holds needs to be
freed from danger of suit not merely within the jurisdiction where he
holds the res, but also wherever claimants asserting legal title to the
res may harass him with suits ....
"Since, then, here as elsewhere a statute which authorizes a court of
equity to deal with absent defendants is, although a necessary element
in the relief, not by itself sufficient, recourse must he had to a statute
enabling the court to give a real effect to its decree. Here, again,
the interstate character of a great part of our business relations, a matter
of which insurance is of course a notable instance, makes legislation
to enable the settlement of title, not merely to real property but to funds
of money, in a single suit a highly necessary reform. It should be
possible for the innocent holder of such a fund to be able to pay it
into court, and then by published notice summon all parties interested
to participate in an adjudication as to the title to the fund. wbich should
be conclusive upon all claimants wherever they are resident. The same
doctrine should be extended, and is in practice extended, to the cases
of creditors' suits, in which, under the doctrine of rewarding the dili-
"Order LVII, Rule Io; see Merlin, Interpleader (19o7) 44. When claimants
appear they will be prevented from suing either the applicant or each other.
Horner v. Lehman (1917) 130 Md. 275, ioo At. 285.
' For the jurisdiction, Minor, Conflict of Laws (19O1) sec. 121; NoTES (1916)
16 COL. L. REv. 414; see also (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 519; contra: Beale, op. cit.
supra note 26.
' (1915) 63, 65. The footnotes and discussion of Gary v. N. W. Masotiic Aid
Assoc., supra note 55, and Cross v. Armstrong, supra note 4o, are omitted.
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gent creditor, equity treats the assets of the debtor as a fund in court for
distribution, and after proper publication to give all who have claims
against the fund the opportunity to come in and make their claims, bars
for laches those who fail to come. This is really a proceeding in rem.
A statute which would settle the vexed question of the jurisdiction of
personal liability by giving the court having jurisdiction over the debtor
or over the debtor's property authority to deal with claims of creditors
against him on the lines suggested by the practice in creditors' suits, is
highly desirable."
A note in the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW says :60
"If we may assume that a chose in action connotes a right to sue at
law for a recovery against the obligor, then it may well be said that the
situs of the chose in action will be wherever that right exists; and since
the obligor generally 'May be sued wherever he is found, it will follow
that the situs is with his person. There should be no more difficulty
with the conception of a man in one state owning a chose ill actioi the
situs of which is in another state than with the conception of his owning
land or chattels similarly situated. Nor does the possession in one
state of a promissory note, stock certificate, or other evidence of an
obligation, the situs of which is in another state, present any greater
inconsistency than the case of a deed or bill of sale in one state as
evidence of title to property. situated in another. In short, the logical
rule would seem to be that a chose in action is property whose situs is
with the person of the debtor or obligor. Where the obligor is a cor-
poration doing business in several states and having in such states duly
accredited agents upon whom process may be served, it is well settled
that suit may be brought against it in any state where it is so repre-
sented ....
If the situs of a chose in action be deemed to be with the creditor, it
is difficult to see how any adjudication could ever be obtained upon a
state of facts such as are presented in that case where the parties claim-
ing are residents of different states. The same inconvenience would
also arise if there were but one person claiming adversely to the plaintiff
and that person resided in a state where the insurance company had no
duly accredited agent."
In support of this general position that interpleader by the debtor
should be allowed as a proceeding in ren, several groups of cases have
been mentioned as analogous.
(a) Wartime confiscation of debts. A sovereign in the exercise of
his war power has frequently ordered debts owed to enemy aliens by
persons within his territory, to be paid to his government, e. g. to the
Alien Property Custodian."' This action seems analogous to inter-
pleader if it goes beyond sequestration of the debt until the international
controversy is settled, and involves a permanent seizure of property
of the debtor equivalent to the amount of the debt. The sovereign's
'°NoTEs (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 414, 415, note; the footnotes are omitted.
.61 NOTES (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 960, noting Russek v. Angulo (1922, Tex. Civ.
App.) 236 S. W. 131. That creditors in an allied or neutral nation may be injured
by such confiscation, see (922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 435.
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physical and legislative power to make such a seizure remains undoubted,
but apart from the discouragement to international commerce in peace
and the injustice to the civilian creditor, the seizure is unjust to the
debtor unless at the same time his obligation to the enemy creditor be
extinguished so that the creditor cannot force him in the courts of
another country to make a second payment. Of course, such an
extinguishment can be assured by a treaty between the confiscating
sovereign and the enemy nation, but unless it is so assured the debt
seems not to be discharged, and there is a decision by Lord Ellenborough
to that effect.6 2 Consequently, the act of seizure would probably not
be recognized as an adjudication in rem, and at all events is too oppres-
sive to serve as a precedent for litigation between fellow citizens.
(b) Taxation. The United States Supreme Court held.in Black-
stone v. Miller 3 that a deposit in a New York Bank belonging to an
Illinois decedent was subject to the New York inheritance tax. One
of the reasons stated by Justice Holmes was, 6 4 "What gives the debt
validity? Nothing but the fact that the law of the place where the
debtor is will make him pay." In so far as the case rests on this ground
of jurisdiction over the debtor, it has been severely attacked and is
opposed by many state decisions65 as well as by State Tax on Foreign-
held Bonds.66 On the ability theory of taxation, it can hardly be con-
tended that the more the debtor owes, the more he is able to contribute
toward the support of the community. On the protection theory, the
creditor receives no services from the debtor's domicile because of the
mere existence of the debt. Service is received from the state where
the debt was contracted and the state where it is collected by legal
process, but both of these events may occur outside the domicile and
should give rise to taxation, if at all, only when and where they occur.
Blackstone v. Miller 7 must be rested on the other reason given by
Justice Holmes,68 that money in the bank is practically equivalent to
actual coin in the pocket. This reason might afford an analogy for
interpleader by a savings bank in the state where it is located, but not
for interpleader by a life insurance company since insurance is not
equivalent to coin in the pocket. Furthermore, even the broader reason
of Holmes would not justify taxation of the debt in every state where
Wolff v. Oxhohn (1817, K. B.) 6 M. & S. 92. See Rumsek v. Angulo, supra
note 61; COMMENTS (1921) 30 YA.LE LAW JoURNAL, 845.
*' Supra note 52.
Supra note 52, at p. 205, 23 Sup. Ct. at p. 278.
Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARV. L. Rav. 587, 6o3-6o6, citing opposed
cases at p. 6o5, note 90.
(1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 300.
, Supra note 52.
Supra note 5a Accord: Matter of Houdayer (i8_6) I5o N. Y. 37, 44 N. E.
718; but there are several decisions contra, Beale, op. cit. supra note 65, at p. 6o7,
note I0i.
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the debtor corporation does business,69 whereas an insurance company
frequently 'desires interpleader away from its state of incorporation
and in a court where it can reach one of the claimants by personal
service. Finally, tax cases are unsatisfactory precedents for private
litigation. The various states levy taxes wherever they can impose
disagreeable consequences for non-payment without regard to strict
judge-made principles of jurisdiction. They act on the method of the
Irishman at Donnybrook Fair who hit a head wherever he saw it,
and the courts hesitate to restrict the raising of revenue whenever they
can avoid doing so. A judge in issuing a decree may well hesitate to
assume the stringent power of a tax collector.
(c) Creditors' Bills. If the estate of an insolvent debtor in state X
is under administration in a court of X, creditors, including non-resi-
dents, may be notified to come in before a certain day or else be forever
barred. Huston, in the passage quoted,7 0 particularly relies on such
cases. They are, however, not parallel to interpleader, because they
involve a true res in the jurisdiction, i.e. the property of the insolvent.
Non-residents who fail to come in may be barred just as in the admin-
istration of a decedent's estate. The distinction from interpleader is,
that such creditors are barred with respect to the actual fund in X. but
not with respect to the debt. It is true that after a discharge in insolv-
ency in the state courts of X such non-resident creditors may not share
in the estate now under distribution; but the right against the debtor
still exists, and his discharge in X is no defence if they sue him in
another state or even in X.71 On the other hand, an interpleader decree
will not be adequately effective unless it bars actions against the
stakeholder in another state.
(d) Suits by a Claimant to Life Insurance. When two citizens of
different states dispute over the ownership of an insurance policy, one
of them sometimes sues the insurance company in his own state where
it does business, and joins the non-resident claimant who is not per-
sonally served and fails to appear. This situation is exactly the same
in substance as if the insurance company had brought interpleader.
Indeed, New Hampshire and Connecticut allow interpleader proceedings
"Even a temporary bank deposit is not taxable at the situs of the bank, Matter
of Leopold (1goi, Surro. Ct.) 35 N. Y. Misc. 369, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1O32; see Beale,
op. cit. supra note 65, at p. 6o8. Deposits in a branch bank in one state would
a fortiori not be taxable in another state where there was a branch.
" Supra note 59, citing Kerr v. Blodgett (1871) 48 N. Y. 62, 66; Samples v.
Bank (1873, C. C., 5th) r Woods, 523; Hallett v. Hallett (1829, N. Y.) 2 Paige
Ch. 15, 22; Williamson v. Wilson (1826, Md.) i Bland, 418, 44o; Smith v. Bank
of New England (1897) 69 N. H. 254; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. i9o8) 31o.
Dicey deals chiefly with decedents' estates, which are undoubtedly res within the
jurisdiction, but also cites In re Maudslay Sons & Field [igoo] i Ch. 602.
' Ogden v. Saunders (1827, U. S.) 12 Wheat. 213; Security Trust Co. v. Dodd.
Mead & Co. (1899) 173 U. S. 624, 19 Sup. Ct. 545; Phoenix National Bank v.
Batcheller (i8go) 151 Mass. 589, 24 N. E. 917.
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to be started by one of the claimants.72  Consequently, the few cases
which allow this type of proceeding against the non-resident claimant
to life insurance would furnish good authority for interpleader by the
insurance company, if it were not for the fact that they are opposed by
other decisions which deny relief.74  Furthermore some such cases
may be distinguished on special grounds,7 5 for instance, that the insur-
ance company has with the authorization of all the claimants, under the
terms of the policy, appropriated a specific fund within the jurisdiction
to the payment of this particular policy, so that the fund and not the
company is now the debtor. In so far as the cases which grant relief
in these proceedings by a claimant can not be distinguished, they must
be regarded as unsound according to the reasoning of the cases which
deny interpleader against a non-resident. In other words, this type
of case must stand or fall with the interpleader cases."'a An attempt
has been made to justify relief to the claimant on the ground that he
seeks the removal of a cloud on his chose in action,7 6 but the assump-
tion that there is a chose in action within the jurisdiction begs the
question. If in fact the non-resident claimant is entitled to the obliga-
7" Webster v. Hall (188o) 60 N. H. 7; Browzn v. Clark (9o8) 80 Conn. 419,
68 Atl. 1ooi, statutory. This is also possible in the corresponding Scotch pro-
ceeding "multiplepoinding." "Contra: Sprague v. West (1879) 127 Mass. 471; 2
Ames, Cases on Equity Jurisdiction (19o4) 3, note.
' Morgan v. Mut. Bemn Life Ins. Co. (19o7) 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438, but
see N. Y. cases in note 74; Perry v. Young, supra note 53. Perry v. Young is
approved in (1916) 16 Co. L. %av. 414, and ibid. 519; but see note 75a, infra.
On the effect of the location of the policy in these cases, see notes 53, 55, supra.
" Mahr v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Co., supra note 55 (N. Y.) ; Gleason v. North
Western Life Ins. Co., supra note 53 (N. Y.) ; Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins.
Co., supra note 55 (N. Y.) ; but see note 73; McBride v. Garland, supra note 53
(N. J.).
" See the attempt in the Schoenholz case, supra note 55, to distinguish the Morgan
case, supra note 73, as involving only a lien on the policy for premiums paid; the
dissenting judge thought the cases indistinguishable. On the fund theory, see
Hanna v. Stedman, supra note 55. See McKennell v. Payne (1921, 2d Dept.) 197
App. Div. 34o, 189 N. Y. Supp. 7, attorney's lien on New York fund of non-resident
client, distinguishing Hanna v. Stedman.
4' Perry v. Young, supra note 53, is condemned in L. R. A. 1917 B, 393, note,
as contrary to N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, supra note 55; the Schoenholz case
regards the Morgan case as overruled by Hanna v. Stedman. McBride v. Gar-
land, supra note 53, regards the want of interpleader jurisdiction as fatal to a.
proceeding by the claimant. However Gleason v. N. W. Life Ins. Co., supra
note 53, treats the two proceedings differently. Cf. Royal Neighbors of America
v. Fletcher (ig2i, Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 476.
", (7916) z6 CoL. L. REv. 519. The cases cited hold that certificates of stock are
personal property within the jurisdiction, from which clouds may be removed
without personal service on non-resident claimants; accord: Jellenik v. Huron
Copper Mining Co. (19oo) 177 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559; cf. Crichton v. Wingfield
(x922) 258 U. S. 66, 42 Sup. Ct. 229. But a life insurance policy is not such a
specialty (p. 7O supra) but merely a chose in action. See Evans v. Scribners'
Sons, supra note 43.
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tion of the insurance company, the chose in action is outside the forum,
unless it be said that it exists wherever the debtor is, and this is the very
question at issue. Surely the conception of a chose in action existing
in every state where a large life insurance company does business is
absolutely different from land or a chattel which possesses a definite
situs at any given moment.
(e) Foreign Garnishment. If P, the alleged creditor of D, gar-
nishes G, who owes a debt to D, in any state where personal service over
G can be obtained, whether or not this is G's domicile, and the court
orders G to pay the debt to P, such payment is a bar to suit by D
against G in any other state in the United States. The Supreme Court
of the United States has repeatedly held7" that the judgment of the
state of garnishment must be given full faith and credit in another
state although the order was made without personal jurisdiction over
the principal debtor, D. On this point, there is no longer possible any
conflict of authority so that the garnishment cases constitute the strongest
analogy for interstate interpleader, unless they can be distinguished.
Some of the reasoning of these cases would justify interpleader in the
absence of one or both claimants. Thus Justice McKenna says,7 8 "The
right of a creditor and the obligation of a debtor are correlative but
different things . . . Whatever of substance there is [in the situs
of a debt] must be with the debtor. He and he only has something in
his hands. That something is the res, and gives character to the action
as one in the nature of a proceeding in rem." And Justice Peckham
makes a similar separation of the debtor's obligation from the creditor's
right :79, "Power over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on
the courts of the state where the writ issues. Blackstone v. Miller ....
The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies
"Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm (1899) 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797;
King v. Cross (1899) 175 U. S. 396, 20 Sup. Ct. 131; Harris v. Balk (19o5) 1g8
U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625; here the garnishee was temporarily present in the
state where he was served; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Deer (19o6) 200 U. S. 176,
26 Sup. Cto7; B. & 0. R. R. v. Hostetter (1916) 24o U. S. 620, 36 Sup. Ct.
475. The state cases are collected in ig L. R. A. 577, note; 67 L. R. A. 209,
note; 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 6o8; 2o L. R. A. (N. s.) 264, note; L. R. A. 1915F,
88o, note; 44 L. Ed. 211, note; 69 Am. St. Rep. 112, note; Ann. Cas. z9i8C,
829, note. The pending garnishment action will cause stay of execution in a suit
by the principal debtor against the garnishee. Ann. Cas. 1916B, 365, note. A
judgment debt is not subject to garnishment outside the state. Ann Cas. I914A,
957, note. The doctrine of the United States Supreme Court is adversely criticized
by Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt
(1913) 27 HARV. L. REv. 107, coblecting the cases. Minor, op. cit. supra note 58,
sec. 125, takes the same view as the Supreme Court. The English law is probably
contra to ours, supra note 32, so that international recognition of the judgment is
not assured.
r' Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, supra note 77 at p. 714, 716, 19 Sup. Ct. at
p. 799.
'2 Harris v. Balk, supra note 77, at pp. 222, 223, 25 Sup. Ct at pp. 626, 627.
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him wherever he goes .... It is nothing but the obligation to pay
which is garnished or attached."
I This attempt to divide a debt into two independent parts recalls the
story of the two men who bought a cow, one owning the front portion
and the other the rear, until the front owner, wearying of supplying
food while the other got all the milk, decided to kill his half, "and Bill's
half died too, it did." Any judicial action upon the debtor's obligation
must necessarily affect the creditor's right, and therefore he is a neces-
sary party to the suit. In disregarding this principle the garnishment
cases take a position which is somewhat supported by long usage and
has some practical advantages (and practical disadvantages as well8"),
but which ought not to be extended by analogy to controversies which
involve something different from the discharge of the debt in favor of
the creditor of the garnishee's creditor. Even in garnishment pro-
ceedings such an extension is refused. If the court where garnishment
is sought determines that the garnishee's debt was owed to the principal
debtor and not to a non-resident claimant, C2, who does not appear, this
adjudication of the ownership of the debt does not bind C2, who may
sue the garnishee in another state and force him to pay a second time.81
The court may dismiss the garnishment proceedings on the ground that
the garnishee is not indebted at all; this adjudication of the non-exist-
ence of the debt does not bind the principal debtor, who may sue the
garnishee and recover, even in the same state. 2 Such results may
follow from the procedural nature of garnishment; but seem incon-
sistent with the theory that jurisdiction over the debtor really gave
jurisdiction in rem over the debt, for then the court -could determine
the existence or ownership of the debt as well as discharge it. The bad
results, if such sweeping power to destroy the rights of absent non-,
residents could be invoked by a debtor, are illustrated by Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Nelson Co.,8 in which the sureties on a bond sued to
enjoin an action at law by the obligee, and served him by publication.
The bill was, "of course, dismissed, but would have been warranted if
the presence of the debtor really gave jurisdiction in rein, and any
debtor could go into a local court, especially if declaratory judgments
were allowed, 4 and obtain a decision that he had a good defence to the
claim of a non-resident. If a non-resident claimant may be bound by
"Beale, op. cit. supra note 77, at p. 121.
Ward v. Boyce (1897) 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. i8o; 2 Shinn, Attachment and
Garnishntent (19oo) sec. 727.
"Ruff v. Ruff (1877) 85 Pa. 333; 2 Shinn, op. cit. sec. 725.
' (1920, App. D. C.) 267 Fed. 746.
"For an example of a declaratory judgment of non-liability of the plaintiff, see
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay [1915, C. A.] 2 K. B. 536. Even where declara-
tory judgments are not permitted, the debtor might ask for cancellation of an instru-
ment within the jurisdiction on quia timet grounds, or seek injunction of an action
at law as in the District of Columbia case, supra note 83.
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interpleader, where there is also a resident claimant, it is only a small
step farther to bind the non-resident when he is the only claimant
against the debtor-plaintiff. In short, the garnishment cases should not
establish a general principle of jurisdiction in rem, but merely represent
an isolated rule.
This survey of the analogous cases shows that the wartime confisca-
tion, taxation, and creditors' bills decisiohs do not support interstate
interpleader, that the insurance cases are divided and the garnishment
cases confined to their special field. As for the -interpleader cases
themselves, consideration of their attitude toward the broad in rem
theory may best be deferred until we take up those authorities directly.
(2) Even if the presence of the debtor within a state does not per se
give its courts power to bind the non-resident claimant, it has been
contended that when the applicant pays the amount of the debt into
court, a fund is thereby created within the state, so that the proceeding
is thenceforth in ren. 5  In support of this view are occasional state-
ments in ordinary interpleader cases, that the second stage is in rem
with each claimant a plaintiff against the res. Such expressions, how-
ever, mean at most that there is no formal plaintiff and defendant in the
second stage or that its scope is limited to the award of the res.8  If
this stage were in rem in the fullest sense,8 7 like a prize condemnation,
the title of the winning claimant to an interpleaded chattel would be
established not only against the loser but against persons generally,
although they were not parties to the original bill. On the contrary,
such an outsider may intervene in the second stage and assert his claim
to the chattel,'8 or may doubtless sue the winning claimant for it after
the interpleader decree is entered.
The truth is, that if the original debt in the interstate cases be not a
res in the debtor's state, but a two-ended affair, the debtor can not by
his own action of payment into court, unshared by the non-resident
potential creditor, transform the debt into a fund within the state.
'See Walsh v. Rhall (1892, C. P.) 6 Kulp (Luzerne Cty., Pa., Legal Reg.
Rept.) 483, which denied interpleader against a N. Y. claimant on the ground that
the res had not been paid into court
'Brown, J., Schrader Co. v. Bailey Groc. Co. (1917) 15 Ala. App. 647, 649, 74
So. 749, 75o: "The money, when paid into court, is in custodia legis, and the suit
partakes of the nature of a proceeding in rein,." See Estill v. Estill (1917) 147
Ga. 358, 362, 94 S. E. 3o4, 3o7; supra note 9; Lowry v. Downing Mfg. Co. (1917)
73 Fla. 535, 538, 74 So. 525.
TOn the 'various meanings attached to the phrase in rem., see Hohfeld, Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions (1923) 65 if; also in (1917) 28 YAL,. LAW JoURNAL,
710.
' Rutherford v. Union Land & Cattle Co. (1923, Nev.) 213 Pac. xo44, and cases
cited; Gregory v. Great West Lumber Co. (1915, Sask. Sup. Ct) 22 Dom. L. 70;
Evans v. Evans (1912) 50 Can. S. C. Rep. 262. See also Maclennan, Interpleader
(i9O1) 77, citing Knight v. Yarborough (1846, Miss.) 7 Smed. & Marsh, 179, in
which the bank notes paid into court depreciated during the suit, and the applicant
was directed to make good the deficiency in current specie.
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There is money within the court's control, but that money is not the
debt unless the creditor consents or can be personally ordered by the court
to accept the substituted situation and release the debtor. Until then
the debt continues despite the payment into court, and consequently can
be enforced by the absent claimant, if subsequently he is found entitled
to do so. The payment of the amount of the debt into court does not
make interpleader a proceeding in rem, but is merely a condition pre-
cedent to relief from double vexation, with which the applicant must
comply, so that he may withdraw disinterested from the controversy




The authorities in the United States on the power of a state court to
bind a non-resident by interpleader involve the same three questions
as the British and Imperial cases already discussed,
90 but these questions
will now be considered in reverse order, since the third question, the
extra-territorial effect of the decree, has received the most attention in
our cases.
Does a State Interpleader Decree Bar Suit in Another State?
In the absence of jurisdiction in rem over the debt, interpleader by the
debtor without personal service upon the non-resident claimant would
not seem to be such a judgment as to be entitled to full faith and credit
in another state. The United States Supreme Court, which has the
last word on this question, has so decided in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunlevy.91 Although the facts involve certain additional elements
which prevent the case from being one of interstate interpleader pure
and simple, essentially the same problem is raised. C1, a resident of
Pennsylvania, took out an endowment policy in A, a New York insur-
ance company doing business in Pennsylvania, and assigned it to his
daughter, C2. After the policy had matured for the sum of about
" Hiscock, C. J., in Hanna v. Stedman, supra note 55, at p. 334, 13o N. E. at
p. 568: "The requirement that the plaintiff in such an action shall so bring into
court the moneys which are in dispute is a requirement imposed by a court of
equity as a condition of relieving the debtor from further obligation for costs or
otherwise while the conflicting claimants litigate
Blair, P. J., in Murphy v. Barron (192i) 286 Mo. 390, 408, 228 S. W. 492, 497:
"The reason . . . . is that the court may take control of the fund before dis-
charging the plaintiff who files the bill, and to prevent abuse of the proceedings"'
Cross v. ArIstrong (1887) 44 Ohio .St. 613, 1o N. E. i6o, quoted infra p. 7,5;
accord: Kildare v. Arinstrong (1886, Pa. C. P.) 18 W. N. C. 114; Bullowa v.
Provident Life & Trust Co. (19o, ist Dept.) 125 App. Div. 545, iog N. Y. Supp.
1058 .
See p. 688, supra.
Supra note 55. The record and briefs in the Supreme Court will be found in
the Harvard Law School Library.
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$2,500, B, a Pennsylvania creditor of C2, who was now a resident of
California, acquired a valid judgment against her for about $500, and
began an action at law in Pennsylvania against A and C, to garnish a
corresponding portion of the insurance money, obtaining constructive
service on C2 in California. The policy was in Pennsylvania. C1
appeared, denied the validity of the assignment, and claimed the full
amount due on the policy. C2 then began an action in -California to
recover the insurance money, and the California court made personal
service on both A and C1. While this California suit was pending, A
filed an interpleader motion in the Pennsylvania garnishment action.
The motion was granted, notice was given to C2 in California, and A
paid the whole insurance money into court. All parties except C.,
having appeared, the validity of the assignment was tried, and the insur-
ance money was awarded and paid over to C1. This Pennsylvania deci-
sion was set up by A as a defense in the California suit, which had been
removed to the United States District Court. The decision of that
court,9 2 disregarding the Pennsylvania proceedings and ordering A to
pay the insurance money over again to C2 , was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit,9 and by the United States
Supreme Court.
When an interstate interpleader case again comes before the Supreme
Court, an attempt may conceivably be made to distinguish the Dunlevy
case on various grounds. (a) The interpleader was not at the domicile
of the debtor. This, however, seems immaterial in view of the deci-
sions allowing jurisdiction of the debt for purposes of garnishment
wherever the debtor can be found.9 4 and it is clear that if interstate
interpleader is to be of any real value to life insurance companies, it
must be permitted outside the state of incorporation, wherever the com-
pany can reach at least one claimant. The Federal Interpleader Act
attaches no importance to the place of incorporation. 5 (b) An unusual
feature of this case was that the rights of all the parties could have been
adequately settled in the California court which possessed complete
personal jurisdiction. This fact might have led the Pennsylvania court
to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in. rem but could not deprive it of tha
' The decision of Van Fleet, J., is printed in the record in the Supreme Court,
at p. 122.
" (1914) 214 Fed. i. Dietrich, J., dissented on the ground that the garnishment
proceeding gave the Pennsylvania court jurisdiction over the debt to the extent
of B's claim, so that the insurance company should be protected to the extent of
$5oo; this view is contra to the cases holding that the ownership of the garnishee's
obligation may not be adjudicated in garnishment proceedings, supra note 81.
"Harris v. Balk, supra note 77; see also Brown v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc.
(1902) 187 U. S. 308, 23 Sup. Ct. 123, holding that a pending action by one
administrator at the company's domicile was no bar to another action by another
administrator at the domicile of the creditor, where the company was merely
doing business.
"' See infra note 128.
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jurisdiction if it was otherwise present (c) It might be urged that
the real explanation of the Dunlevy case is that it started as a garnish-
ment proceeding and was consequently nothing more than an applica-
tion of the well settled principle already set forth,
9 that the court of
garnishment has no jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the debt.
While this contention derives some support from the extent to which
the arguments of counsel were confined to the garnishment aspects of
the case,97 it must be rejected as unsound because the original Pennsyl-
vania proceeding was just as clearly transformed into an interpleader
action by A's motion as if the insurance company had filed an inter-
pleader bill in equity. The opinion of the Supreme Court is expressly
devoted to the scope of interpleader. (d) The decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals held the Pennsylvania proceedings invalid on the
ground that the constructive service on C, did not conform to the Penn-
sylvania statute and Learned Hand, J., has suggested that the Dunlevy
case may turn wholly upon the condition of the Pennsylvania law,98
but the Supreme Court assumed without any question that the notice to
C. was made with due formalities and rested entirely upon general
grounds of jurisdiction as will appear from the language of Mr. Justice
McReynolds :
"Although herself outside the limits of the State, such disposition of
the property [discharge in garnishment proceedings] would have been
binding on her . . . . But the interpleader initiated by the company
was an altogether different matter. This was an attempt to bring about
a final and conclusive adjudication of her personal rights, not merely
to discover property and apply it to debts. And unless in contempla-
tion of law she was before the court and required to respond to that
issue, its orders and judgments in respect thereto were not binding on
her. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714."
While this decision accords with the view that jurisdiction over the
debtor does not confer jurisdiction in rem over the debt, it must be
remembered that reasoning exactly contrary to that view was used by
Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Peckham to support the power
of the court where the debtor was, to bind the non-resident creditor in
the garnishment cases. 10 0 The difficulty of reconciling the Duntevy
" Supra note 8I.
97 No interpleader case was cited in either brief before the Supreme Court; none
was cited by the opinions of the two lower courts; the only interpleader case
mentioned by Mr. Justice McReynolds was Cross v. Armstrong, supra note 89.
Sherman National Batik v. Shubert Theatrical Co. (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 238
Fed. 225, 229.
" Supra note 55. Tife broad interpretation of the Dmdevy case has been taken
in Flexner v. Farson (1918) 248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 98; Hanna v.
Stedman, supra note 55, and other state cases; and by the editor of the note in
L. R A. I917B, 393.
' Notes 78 and 79, supra; see also Mr. Justice Holmes, Blackstone v. Miller,
supra note 64. Garnishment cases were relied on in Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
infra note lo2, a minority case.
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case with that reasoning is very great, and it is therefore probable that
the doctrine of the garnishment cases must be limited to the precise
situation there before the Supreme Court, and that the theory therein
enunciated that the situs of a debtor's obligation circulates with the
debtor can no longer be regarded as accepted by the court.
The Dunlevy case determines that the courts of state Y are not
forced by the full faith and credit clause to give effect to an interstate
interpleader decree of state X rendered without personal jurisdiction
over a claimant who is suing in Y. On the other hand the full faith
and credit clause would not in any way prevent the courts of Y from
recognizing the interpleader if they chose to do so.' 10 Therie have been
many cases in which state courts have been asked to give such recog-
nition, but with the exception of one case in Kentuicky, they have
uniformly refused to do so.20 2  In most of these cases, the subsequent
suit was allowed against the applicant, but in Cross v. Armstrong'
03
it was allowed against the winning claimant. The reasoning of some
of these opinions goes deeper into the problem of interstate interpleader
than the Dunlevy case. The courts squarely take the position that
interpleader of a debt is not in rem. A suit by one person against an
insurance company is clearly a proceeding in personam. If two persons
bring separate suits against the company on the same policy, each suit is
in personam. Interpleader is nothing but a device to unite these two
"I It may be objected that since the Dunlevy case holds that an interpleader decree
in X is not binding on Q in Y because of the want of personal service, a judg-
ment in a court in Y that the interpleader does bind C2 would be equally invalid,
under Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) 95 U. S. 714. The answer is that the Y court
did have jurisdiction over C2, and so could bind him. The Y decision that the X
decree was entitled to recognition might be unsound, in view of the reasoning of
the Dunlevy case, but it would be rendered with due process of law. Consequently,
the courts of another state, Z, would have to give full faith and credit to the Y
judgment even though they considered the X decree invalid. A similar question
was raised by an absentee divorce, in Bidwell v. Bidwell (9o5) 139 N. C. 402,
52 S. E. 55; see the comment in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 325, note.
' After each citation, the name of the state where the interpleader decree was
granted is given; it will be noticed that several lower courts gave interpleader
though the highest court in the same state had refused recognition to a similar
decree elsewhere. The state cases denying recognition are: Gary v. North Western
Mutual Aid Assoc., supra note 55, Illinois; Expressmen's Mut. Ben. Assoc. v.
Hurldck (19oo) 91 Md. 585, 46 At. 957, New York; Ward-v. Bankers' Life Co.
(1916) 99 Neb. 812, 157 N. W. 1017, Iowa; Hinton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1900) 126 N. C. 18, 35 S. E. 182, Ohio; Cross v. Armstrong, supra note 89,
Pennsylvania; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Gooding (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App.
49o, 49 S. W. 123, Missouri; see dicta in Coe v. Garvey (i9o6) 13o Ill. App. 221,
224; Hanna v. Stedman, supra note 55.
Contra: Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. (igo8) 128 Ky. 799, 11o S. W. 265, Ohio.
One ground of recognition was the presence of the policy in the Ohio court; on
this see supra notes 53, 55.
" Supra note 89.
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suits in one litigation, 04 which continues to be in personam *and does
not change its character when the money is paid into court. 10 5 It is an
attempt to adjudicate mere personal rights to a money demand.10 6 The
ablest discussion is by Spear, J., in Cross v. Armstrong, who says in
part :107
"Why was the Philadelphia action, in its nature, not a proceeding
between parties claiming right to money due under the policy, rather
than a proceeding to determine the status of such money? If it was
the former, then the efficacy of the judgment depended upon having
the parties before the court, so that their conflicting claims could be
adjudicated; . .. It was not the status of any particular money that
was to be determined, for any money which was a legal tender would
have effectually satisfied the claim of the party receiving it; nor was there
any claim primarily by even the widow, much less the administrator,
to any money in specie . . . We do not understand that an action
in personam, simply because a debtor brings money, the right to recover
which is in contention, and gives to the custody of the court a sum
sufficient to discharge his debt, changes into an action in rem ...
". ... Does the mere fact that the company (the debtor) being
sued, voluntarily delivers money to the clerk of the court rather than
keeps it in its own safe, or to its credit in the bank, or loaned upon call,
change the action from one in personam to one in rena? We think not."
Does a State Interpleader Decree Bar Suit in the Same State?
It is conceivable that an interpleader decree against a non-resident
may not be such a judgment as to be entitled to full faith and credit in
another state and nevertheless be valid in the courts of the state where
it was rendered. The Connecticut divorce in Haddock v. Haddock,0 8
left the parties married in New York but single in Connecticut. A
non-resident who has been forever enjoined in X from asserting his
I"Fowler, J., Expresinan's Mut. Ben. Assoc. v. Hurlock, supra note lO2, at
P. 594, 46 AtI. at p. 959. "There were several claimants for the money due on the
policies-but this fact certainly would not change the character of the suit from
one in personam to one in rem"
'See supra note 89.
I"Rothrock, J., in Gary v. North Western Mutual Aid Assoc. (1893, Iowa) 50
N. W. 27, 28.
't Supra note 89, at pp. 625 ff, io N. E. at p. 65.
1s (19o6) 201 U. S. 562 26 Sup. Ct. 525. This case is the only exception dis-
covered under our Constitution to the principle: "If a judgment is conclusive
in the State where it was pronounced, it is equally conclusive everywhere.'"
Christnms v. Russell (1866, U. S.) 5 Wall. 290, 302, by Clifford, J., quoting 2 Story,
Constitution (3d ed. 1858) sec. 1313. Thus a state insolvency discharge not only
has no extra-territorial effect against a non-resident creditor, Ogden v. Saunders,
supra note 71; Felch v. Bugbee (1859) 48 Me. 9; but it does not even bar him
from suing the debtor in the state which rendered the discharge, Phoenix National
Bank v. Batcheller, supra note 71. See Holmes, J., dissenting in Haddock v. Had-
dock, supra at pp. 628, 632: "I am unable to reconcile with the requirements of the
Constitution, Article 4, section i, the notion of a judgment being valid and binding
in the State where it is rendered, and yet depending for recognition to the same
extent in other States of the Union upon the comity of those States."
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claim against the applicant may perhaps have to obey the injunction
in X although he is still free to sue him elsewhere. Such limited pro-
tection would be of very little use if the applicant is a life insurance
company which may easily be sued in any of the numerous states where
it does business; but it would be valuable to a savings bank which can
only be reached personally in X, its state of incorporation, and does
not ordinarily possess elsewhere much property liable to attachment.
It will be remembered that Lord Eldon and Baron Pollock'0 9 merely
stated that they would enjoin subsequent suits in England and did not
seek any extra-territorial effect for their orders.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, may render such decrees
against a non-resident invalid even within the jurisdiction. It may seem
strange to suggest that any judicial action sanctioned by Lord Eldon
would not be due process of law. Nevertheless, he went very far in
other equitable proceedings"" to bind non-residents by his decrees, and
in at least one such type of proceeding, representative suits, his position
has been rejected by our courts as too extreme."' The extra-territorial
cases seem to have settled that interpleader is an action in personamn.
Consequently, an interpleader decree without personal service falls
squarely within Pennoyer v. Neff" 2 and seems wholly invalid even in
the courts of the state where it was rendered.
This reasoning is supported by several state cases which refuse to
grant interpleader against non-residents."' These decisions, however,
only show that a state may refuse to interplead a non-resident, but do
not tell what would happen if interpleader was granted and he subse-
" See the extracts from their opinions, pp. 688, 691, supra.
"'Dutton v. Morrison (181o, Ch.) 17 Ves. 193, proceedings against partnership
with non-resident partner; Adair v. New River Co. (805, Ch.) I' Ves. 429, 444,
representative suit.
" Amer. Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' Union (1898, C. C. N. D. Ohio)
90 Fed. 598, 6o5.
" Supra note ioI; see Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law
(922) 34 if, and other references in supra note 4o. Cf. the English situation
where there is no Constitution, supra note 28.
"' Coe v. Garvey, supra note io2; Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Looney (1913) ISo Ill.
App. 488; Brighton v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge (1922) 217 Mich. 65o, 187 N. W.
363; Bullowa v. Provident Loan & Trust Co. (igo8, 1st Dept.) 125 App. Div.
545, io9 N. Y. Supp. io58; Rosenthal v. United Transportation Co. (1921, 1St
Dept.) 196 App. Div. 540, i88 N. Y. Supp. 154; Devoy ,. Nelles (1921, 1st Dept.)
197 App. Div. 628, i8p N. Y. Supp. 492; Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Berman
(19o8) 7 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 145, I8 Oh. Dec. 772; Cleveland National Bank v.
Burroughs Land Co. (1917) 1O Oh. App. 61; Kildare v. Arnstrong, supra. note 89;
Orient Ins. Co. v. Sloan, (1888) 70 Wis. 611, 36 N. W. 388. See dicta in Hills v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1916, C. C.) 39 N. J. L. J. 132; McBride v'. Garland, supra
note 53; Barry v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc. (1873, N. Y.) 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.)
385, note. Contra: Walsh v. Rha.ll, supra note 85, senble; and see Moore -v.
Lelar (185o, Pa. D. C.) I Phila. 72; Melton v. Am. Surety Co. (1922, Tex. Civ.
App.) 24o S. W. 574, which allow interpleader against resident of another county;
see also supra note 1O2, first sentence, last clause.
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quently sought to sue the applicant in X despite the injunction. The
only final determination of our question would be a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States holding that the injunction was,
or was not, issued with due process of law. Until such a decision
occurs, the nearest approach to an answer is furnished by Hanna v.
Stedman11 4 in New York. The proceeds of a life insurance policy
issued by a New York fraternal association were claimed by the estate
of the insured and the estate of the beneficiary, his wife, who prede-
ceased him. Most of the claimants were residents of Maryland. The
society filed a bill of interpleader in New York. The husband's repre-
sentative appeared but not the wife's representative who was served
by publication. The money was awarded to the husband's estate.
Then the wife's representative sued the society in the Maryland courts
which refused to recognize the New York interpleader decree and
gave judgment for the plaintiff. Several years later, the wife's repre-
sentative sued the society on this judgment in New York. The Appel-
late Division decided that the Maryland judgment was not entitled to
full faith and credit because the controversy had been made
res adjudicata in New York by the interpleader decree. This was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hiscork, C. J., stated that inter-
pleader was not a proceeding in remi, so that the New York decree had
been issued without jurisdiction on the Maryland claimant and could
not prevent the Maryland judgment from being effective in New York.
This decision does not necessarily mean that the New York decree would
have been void in New York in the absence of the Maryland judgment,
but the reasoning goes very far in that direction. Therefore, it seemsI.
impossible for a debtor to protect himself from subsequent suit by a
non-resident claimant either outside or within the state.
Another obstacle to an interstate interpleader suit is that the non-
resident claimant may have already begun an action at law against
the applicant in a different jurisdiction from the state court in which
interpleader is sought. If such an action at law has been started in
a United States court in the same state, which has jurisdiction for
diversity of citizenship, the state court will refuse to enjoin the pending
federal action, and this makes interpleader impossible." 5 Conversely,
if interpleader is sought in the United States court, e. g. when the
three parties are citizens of different states, relief will be denied if it
would necessitate enjoining a pending action in the local state court. 16
"' (192i) 230 N. Y. 326, 13o N. E. 566; noted in (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
86o; reversing (1918, Ist Dept.) 185 App. Div. 491, 173 N. Y. Supp. 223. The
Maryland decision is Expressmien's Mut. Ben. Assoc. v. Hurlock, supra note 102.
"1 Schuyler v. Pelissier (1838, N. Y.) 3 Edw. Ch. 191; Smith v. Reed (i9o8)
74 N. J. Eq. 776, 70 Atl. 961.
" City Bank of N. Y. v. Skelton (1846, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 2 Blatchf. 14-
Accord: Lowther v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., infra note 13o, under Federal Interpleader
Act. See infra note 138.
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This obstacle would be fatal in both cases even if personal service
could be made on the non-resident claimants. In the same way; one
state court would perhaps refuse to ward off, by interpleader, a pend-
ing action at law in the state courts of another state,"17 even when the
difficulty about personal jurisdiction was obviated.
Will Notice of Interpleader to a Non-Resident Claimant be Issued?
Even if a stakeholder cannot obtain protection against a non-resi-
dent claimant who fails to appear, he may wish to file a bill of inter-
pleader and have the non-resident notified, with the hope that he may
be willing to come into the state and assert his claim in the interpleader
proceedings. As already shown," 8 a reasonable non-resident would
have considerable cause for responding to the notice. The best modem
English and Irish authorities have felt it unobjectionable for a court
to entertain the bill for this purpose, and there seems no constitutional
objection in this country. No satisfactory decisions on the point have,
however, been found."19 Of course this notice would impose no obli-
gation upon the non-resident, and if he refuses to come in the suit must
be dismissed and the applicant remains without any protection whatever
from the double vexation.
IV
Although the denial of interstate interpleader in the state courts seems
necessitated by sound principles of territorial jurisdiction, the situation
revealed by the preceding discussion undbubtedly causes great hard-
ship. In many of the cases cited, the stakeholder was obliged to make
two payments when it was clear that there was only one liability.
Many other examples of unjust double recovery could be mentioned,
such as Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew,120 and similar injustice has
'Barry v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc, supra note 113. Even if there is personal
service on the claimant who has sued in another state, it is doubtful if the injunc-
tion would be valid, since the only ground for it is avoidance of multiplicity.
There is no fraud, interference with a local receivership, oppression, or evasion of
local exemption laws. On the general topic of injunctions against foreign proceed-
ings, see Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity, 1918-z99 (1920) 33 HARv. L.
Rav. 42o, 425; NOTES (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 92; (1923) 37 HARV. L. Rav. '57;
(1923) 33 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 95; 1 Ames, Equity (i9o) 28, note; i Cook,
Cases on Equity (1923) 323, note; i A. L. R. 148, note.
uBSupra p. 689.
,'In the following cases notice was given to the non-resident, who came into
the interpleader. Whitridge v. Barry (1874) 42 Md. 14o; Fitch v. Brower (i886)
42 N. J. Eq. joo, ii Atl. 330; see Leonard v. lamison (1833, N. Y.) 2 Edw.
Ch.'136. See also note io2, first sentence, last clause.
' (1903) 188 U. S. 291, 23 Sup. Ct 375. A resident of the Hawaiian Republic
took out a life insurance policy payable to his wife, whom he subsequently divorced.
His administrator recovered from the insurance company in Hawaii. Carter v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1895) io Hawaii, 117. The wife recovered from the com-
pany in her new domicile, California, which held that payment "to the wrong party"
was no defense. McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (19Ol) 132 Calif. 85, 64 Pac.
IO3. Since the annexation of Hawaii did not occur till after the trial, the U. S.
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resulted from strict construction of the Federal Interpleader Act here-
after discussed. If C. resides in X and C. in Y, the insurance company
or other stakeholder cannot have interpleader in X for want of juris-
diction over C, or in Y for want of jurisdiction over C,. He must
face two suits at law in the two states with the probability that each
jury will decide in favor of the local claimant and reject the defendant's
argument that he may be liable to the absent and unrepresented claimant.
If interpleader in the state courts is impossible, some other way out of
this situation ought to be found. The law should not remain satisfied
when its own technicalities compel an honest debtor to pay twice over.
We have already seen that the same objections which prevent inter-
state interpleader apply to one proposed alternative, a suit by one claim-
ant to establish his right to insurance money without personal service
on the non-resident claimant. 21
A second alternative was allowed in Whan v. Hope Natural Gas
Co. 12 2  The stakeholder, a corporation doing business in- Pennsylvania
and West Virginia, was garnished in Pennsylvania by a creditor of
the obligee, and was afterwards sued in West Virginia by an alleged
assignee of the obligee, who obtained a judgment against the corpora-
tion. The West Virginia court granted a stay of execution on the
ground that thd Pennsylvania proceeding could settle everything since
garnishment gave the Pennsylvania court jurisdiction in rem over the
obligation. The opinion obviously considers that the West Virginia
claimant who was notified of the Pennsylvania proceedings would be
bound by them, although not personally served therein. This view
seems directly opposed to the Dunlevy case and to the decisions hold-
ing that a garnishment proceeding cannot adjudicate the ownership of
the garnished debt. 23 Furthermore, the stay in the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that the California trial court was not bound to give full faith
and credit to the Hawaiian judgment, even if Hawaii had power to bind the non-
resident wife. Only some sort of "international interpleader" could remedy this
situation.
Other cases of double payment, in addition to those in supra note io0, are Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, infra note i3o; Royal Neighbors 'of America v.
Fletcher (1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 476; see Conn. Mit. Life Ins. Co. v.
Berman (9o8) 7 Oh. N. P. (m. s.) '45, 157.
12 Supra note 75a.
(1917) 8i W. Va. 338, 94 S. E. 365. See the reasons for denial of W. Va.
interpleader because of the pending garnishment proceedings, at p. 344, 94 S. E.
at p. 367; accord, Delta Ins. & Realty Co. v. Fourth National Bank (1921) 127
Miss. 152, 89 So. 817; contra: Livingstone v. Bank of Montreal (1893) 50 Ill.
App. 562. A stay of proceedings on one court was also suggested in Schuyler v.
Pelissier, supra note 115. The questionable'view of Whan v. Hope Natural Gas
Co. that garnishment proceedings can adjudicate the ownership of the debt is also
taken in Kildare v. Armstrong, supra note 89, semble. On the need of protection
for a corporation which is garnished in two states on the same debt, see 67 L. R. A.
22o, note.
I Supra notes 8I, 9i.
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suit relieved the applicant from double vexation, at the expense of a
corresppnding injustice to the local claimant, who was thereby forced
to abide by the decision in a foreign suit in which he was not properly
made a party. This solution is, therefore; unsatisfactory.
A third alternative is the requirement of a bond of indemnity from
the domestic claimant. This would adopt a portion of Lord Eldon's
solution of our problem. If the non-resident claimant does not come
in, the court, -after finding that the domestic claimant makes a good ex
parte case, would award the res to him, on condition that he give a bond
to defend any suit brought by the non-resident against the stakeholder
either in or out of this forum, and to pay any judgment imposed on the
stakeholder in such suit. Although this plan affords the stakeholder
some protection from double payment and perhaps from double vexa-
tion, it is open to several objections. First, it is doubtful whether the
home claimant may be subjected to the expense of a bond which would
not be imposed on him in an action at law brought by him against the
stakeh6lder. After the non-resident fails to respond to the notice, does
not the interpleader suit fail altogether? Is there anything left of it but
a purely legal controversy between the home claimant and the applicant;
or does the latter's fear of double vexation suffice to allow equity to
retain jurisdiction and require the bond? Secondly, multiplicity of
suits may not be avoided, for there may be (a) the original interpleader,
(b) the later suit by the non-resident against the stakeholder, who may
have much difficulty in getting the home claimant to intervene and per-
form his obligation, and (c) a possible suit on the bond. Thirdly, the
bond may deteriorate before the Statute of Limitations has barred the
non-resident claimant, so that the applicant will be subjected to double
liability after all. We need a better method, which will settle the whole
three-cornered controversy once and for all.
A fourth alternative, interpleader in the United States courts, presents
greater possibilities of success. Such courts are not limited, under
the terms of the Constitution, by the boundary lines of a state. Their
powers are determined by Congress, which might permit them, for pur-
poses of interpleader, to exercise personal jurisdiction over claimants
found in any part of the United States. The only limitation on the
power of Congress is found in the Constitutional requirement that the
controversy must be "between citizens of different States" (Art. III,
sec. :2).
Suppose that the applicant and the two claimants reside in three
different states. Under the existing general provisions of statutes
regulating United States courts, interpleader would be as impossible
there as in the state courts, because a United States court cannot acquire
personal jurisdiction by service outside the state wherein its district
lies.'12 Congress could easily remedy this first obstacle by allowing
'Barbour, J., in Toland v. Sprague (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 300, 328: "Congress
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process in interpleader to run throtghout the United States. A
related difficulty at the present time concerns the production of evidence.
After September, 1925, a United States court cannot compel the appear-
ance of a witness living more than one hundred miles from the
court.2 5 Such a restriction might very well operate to the injury of
the distant claimant who, though obliged to appear himself, could not
force his witnesses to come with him. It may be doubted whether
depositions taken where the distant witness resides would be an ade-
quate substitute for his testimony in open court. In opposition to this
proposed legislative extension of power over parties and witnesses, it
may be urged that it would be just as much of a hardship on C, in Cali-
fornia to compel him to appear in the United States Court in Pennsyl-
vania as to force his appearance in the Pennsylvania state court. The
theoretical objection to an interpleader decree like that in the Dunlevy
case is removed but the practical objection is equally great. Our
answer must be that in a situation like this, the Pennsylvania Federal
Court would have to balance the hardship on the California claimant
against the hardship of the stakeholder if he is subjected to double
vexation and the possibility of double recovery; and grant or deny
relief accordingly. Sometimes the Pennsylvania Federal Court could
tell the stakeholder to transfer his interpleader to the United States
Court in California, if the distance would bear less hardly on the
Pennsylvania claimant than on the California claimant. In other
words, these difficulties should go to the exercise of the undoubted
jurisdiction in personam.
Secondly, consider the more difficult situation where one of the
claimants is a citizen of the same state as the applicant. Under the
existing general Federal legislation, the requisite diversity of citizenship
does not exist when citizens of the same state are on different sides
of the controversy. Does the suggested interpleader suit violate this
rule? If we regard the second stage of the interpleader as the real
controversy, and the first stage as merely incidental, then it is suffi-
cient if the claimants are citizens of different states. The citizenship
of the applicant would be immaterial. On the other hand, it is hard
might have authorized civil process from any circuit court to have run into any
state of the Union. It has not done so." An interpleader bill was dismissed for
this reason in Herndon v. Ridgway (1855, U. S.) 17 How. 424. See Hills v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., supra note 113. Of course, if the requisite diversity of citizenship
exists, the district of the applicant would be a proper venue under Judicial Code,
sec. 51, but the plaintiff's district would still be without jurisdiction over a defend-
ant who never came within that state, so as to be served. Rose, Jurisdiction and
Procedure of the Federal Courts (2d ed. 1922) sec. 270.
'U. S. Rev. Stats. i878, sec. 876, imposes the limit stated. This has been
amended to allow subpoenas for witnesses to run into any other district, but the
permission of the court is necessary and cause must be shown if the ioo mile limit
is exceeded; this amendment is effective for only three years from its date. Act of
Sept. 19, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 848).
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to regard the first stage as negligible when we remember that most of
the knock-down and drag-out fights in interpleader suits occur in the
first stage. For example, all the cases on interpleader in Ames'
case-book are contests in this stage between the applicant and at least
one of the claimants on -the question whether interpleader ought to be
granted. If the objecting claimant is a citizen of the same state as
the applicant, the first stage is then clearly not a controversy between
citizens of different states. There are several cases where it was
sought to remove an interpleader suit from a state court to a United
States court, which would have had personal jurisdiction over all the
parties, in which the removal was refused when the applicant was a
co-citizen of one claimant, on the ground that the requisite diversity
of citizenship did not exist. 2 6 It is-said that the three parties to the
interpleader must be citizens of three different states. It may be pos-
sible to distinguish these cases on thE ground that such thorough-going
diversity of citizenship was required by the then existing Federal
legislation on the powers of United States courts, but not by the Con-
stitution. Just as Congress could remove the first obstacle to Federal
interstate interpleader by extending the personal jurisdiction of a
United States court, so it might. conceivably remove this second obsta-
cle by allowing interpleader when the claimants are citizens of different
states regardless of the fact that one of them is a co-citizen of the
applicant. The difficult question, however, is whether the legislation
on this second point would be constitutional. Is the present require-
ment that co-citizens must not be on opposite sides of a suit in the
Federal court merely the result of Congressional legislation judicially
construed,'1 27 or is Congress prevented from permitting such a suit
by the words of the Constitution, "The judicial power shall extend to
all cases . . . . between citizens of different States"?
This very question is raised by the Federal Insurance Interpleader
Act of 1917,128 which was enacted soon after the Dunlevy case and pos-
I Leonard v. Jamison (1833, N. Y.) 2 Edw. Ch. 136, 137: "There is something
to be settled between him and the defendants before the latter can litigate together."
Republic Fire Ins. Co. v. Keogh (1881, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 23 Hun, 644; see George
v. Pilcher (1877, Va.) 28 Gratt 299. In Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen (1883) 134
Mass. 389, where the claimants were Mass. citizens and the applicant a N. Y.
corporation, removal was refused.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss (I8o6, U. S.) 3 Cranch, 267, the earliest case, turned
entirely on the words of the Act of Congress, without mention of the Constitution;
but see cases in note 131.
's Act of Feb. 22, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. 929); U. S. Comp. Stats. 1918, sec. 99Ia.
See "The Federal Interpleader Act: Paper read before the Association of Life
Insurance Counsel, May 12th, i92o, by Joseph S. Conwell, of Counsel, Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania." i pp. This pamphlet
says that the Act was introduced by Representative J. H. Moore, subsequently
mayor of Philadelphia, and was made obscure by changes in committee. Mr.
Conwell devotes much attention to the question, whether an insurance company
bringing interpleader under this statute would violate the anti-removal statutes of
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sibly because of it. The Act endeavors to secure interstate interpleader
for the class of stakeholders who need it most, insurance companies.
It gives the United States District Courts jurisdiction of bills of inter-
pleader by insurance companies if the adverse claimants are citizens
of different states. Nothing in the statute requires that the company
shall not be a co-citizen of one of the claimants. The bill must be filed
in the district where a "beneficiary" resides, which probably includes
an assignee.
29
Although the provisions of the statute are not so liberal as could be
wished, it has already been the means of relief from double vexation
in many cases.130  As yet, the question whether a company may con-
stitutionally take advantage of the statute when it is incorporated in
the same state as the residence of one claimant has not been decided by
the courts, although one case has expressed doubt on this point'13 ' An
extension of this legislation to allow interstate interpleader in the
United States courts by other classes of stakeholders such as savings
banks would be very desirable.
Some light on the constitutional question just discussed is afforded
by Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co232  A New
Jersey corporation sued a New York corporation in an action at law
in the United States District Court in the Southern District of New
York. The defendant filed a bill in equity, 33 asking for interpleader
numerous states. The subsequent decision of Terral v. Burke Construction Co.
(1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188, seems to have dealt the death-blow to such
laws.
' Conwell, op. cit. 5-9; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson; New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy; Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co., all cited in next note.
'"The reported cases decided under the Act, some of which deny relief, are:
Penn Mug. Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson (1917, N. D. Fla.) 244 Fed. 877; see
Conwell, op. cit. supra note 128, at p. 6, for Alabama case in same litigation, also
unsuccessful; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy (1918, S. D. Fla.) 253 Fed.
287; N. E. Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Reid (192o, D. Md.) 263 Fed. 451, affirmed as
Reid v. Durboraw (1921, C. C. A. 4th) 272 Fed. 99; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lott.
(1921, S. D. Calif.) 275 Fed. 365; Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1922,
C. C. A. 3d) 278 Fed. 405, holding that pending-state actions cannot be enjoined;
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenbaum (1922, C. C. A. 3d) 28o Fed. 861.
" Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, supra note 130; see also Penn Mit. Life Ins. Co.
v. Henderson, supra note 13o, at p. 878.
1 (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 238 Fed. 225; affirmed (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 247 Fed. 256.
'Two interesting procedural questions were raised in this case. (i) Could the
defendant in the Federal law suit have sought interpleader by an equitable plea
under Judicial Code, sec. 274 b (Act of March 3, 1915 [38 Stat, at L. 956]). The
Circuit Court of Appeals thought not, but an affirmative answer has since been
given in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank (1922) 260 U. S. 235, 43 Sup.
Ct. 118. See (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 474. (2) If such an equitable plea be
allowed, should interpleader by original bill be refused? The Circuit Court of
Appeals thought so (247 Fed. at 26o), but in other jurisdictions the introduction of
statutory interpleader at law is no bar to interpleader in equity (2 Ames, Cases on
Equity Jurisdiction [19o4] 5o, note). It cannot be said that the remedy at law is
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against various citizens of New York and injunctions of the pending
state and Federal actions at law. This relief was granted. The
court disposed of the co-citizenship between the applicant and the new
claimants on the ground that the interpleader was ancillary to the pend-
ing action at law over which the Federal court had undoubted juris-
diction. (It will be observed that there was no difficulty of personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident claimant in this case since it had
already appeared in the court as plaintiff in the original action at law.)
Considerable doubt has been expressed whether this case is correct in
holding that interpleader is ancillary.1 4 If the decision is sound,
it leads to the peculiar result in the existing state of the law, that the
stakeholder may secure interstate interpleader in the United States
courts against a co-citizen and a non-resident claimant when the appli-
cant has been made a defendant in a pending Federal suit brought by
this non-resident; but he may not have interpleader anywhere (a)
when he has been sued in the local state court by the co-citizen claimant,
or (b) when he files an original bill of interpleader in equity against the
same claimants before any action at law has been brought. In the last
two situations the need for relief would be just as great as in Sheran
National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co.;"3 5 but the requisite diversity
of citizenship would be held not to exist under the present Federal
legislation; and there is doubt whether an Act of Congress permitting
Federal interpleader in the last two situations would be constitutional.
The only other relief conceivable in the United States court in such
a situation would be a bill by the resident claimant to remove a cloud
on title to his chose in action under Section 57 of the Judicial Code
which permits service on non-residents; but this suit, as we have seen,
would not lie because there is no res within the jurisdiction.
13 6 For
similar reasons, Section 57 could not be extended to permit a bill of
interpleader by the debtor. Consequently, it is to be hoped that Con-
gress will see fit to enact legislation which will (a) extend the insur-
ance interpleader statute to cover all stake holders, giving the United
now adequate, for such a plea is held in Liberty Oit'Co. v. Condon National Bank
to be a proceeding in equity. Therefore, a defendant at law should have a choice
of procedutre, either (a) to file an independent bill in equity, or (b) to seek the
same equitable relief in the original action. Learned Hand, J., says that (b) is
plainly ancillary, so that (a), being the same in substance, must also be ancillary.
"It cannot be that the constitutional jurisdiction of this court over the 'controversy'
depends upon the mere form of the remedy." (238 Fed. at 229.)
' See (1917) 3o HARV. L. Rv. 521; but the decision is approved in (1917) 17
COL. L. REV. 56o. In accord is Stone v. Bishop (1878, C. C. D. Mass.) Fed.
Cas. No. 13,482. The decision in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank,
supra note 133, possibly settles the question, since the defendant was allowed to
bring in a co-citizen by his equitable plea; but the possible want of diversity of
citizenship was not discussed by the Supreme Court.
m Supra note 132.
"Supra notes 75a, 76; but see Learned Hand, J., 238 Fed. at 228.
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States District Court similar personal jurisdiction over claimants who
reside outside the District, and (b) allow such interpleader, either by
equitable plea or by original bill, although the applicant is a co-citizen
with one claimant; and that this second feature of the proposed legis-
lation will be held constitutional under the diversity of citizenship
clause.
A third obstacle to federal interpleader, the inability of a United
States court'3 7 to enjoin a pending action at law against the applicant
in a state court, can easily be removed by an Act of Congress permitting
such an injunction in interpleader, just as Congress already allows
state suits to be enjoined in bankruptcy proceedings.
1 38
Such Federal legislation allowing interpleader in the United States
courts seems the most hopeful solution of our problem.
Pending the adoption of such Federal legislation, or if the constitu-
tional objections prove insuperable when the applicant and one claim-
ant are co-citizens, a fourth method still remains. It is analogous to
the method used in France in foreign garnishments, which is approved
by Mr. Beale" 9 as avoiding the unfairness of our plan of allowing the
garnishing creditor to establish and collect a doubtful claim against the
principal debtor in the latter's absence. The garnishing creditor sues the
garnishee, who is enjoined from paying the principal debtor. The gar-
nishing creditor then brings a second suit against the principal debtor
in a court with personal jurisdiction over that debtor. If he estab-
lishes the debt in that suit, he returns to the court of garnishment and
enforces his judgment by compelling the garnishee to pay the gar-
nished debt into court in discharge of that debt and in payment
pro tanto of the principal debt. A similar plan of suits in two states
is available as a substitute for interstate interpleader, and was utilized
in Hills v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.'
40 A Connecticut insurance com-
pany issued policies with the wife of the insured, a New Jersey woman,
as beneficiary. The -insurance money was also claimed by a Con-
necticut bank as assignee. The wife sued in New Jersey. The com-
pany could not interplead in New Jersey because the bank could not be
. Supra note 116. The obstacle thus set up to interpleader by Judicial Code,
sec. 265, Act of March 3, 1911 (32 Stat. at L. 1162), has been held to apply in
proceedings under the Federal Interpleader Act, Lowther v. New York Life
Ins. Co, supra note 13o. This case seems wrong, for Congress in authorizing
interpleader naturally permitted such an essential incident as the protection of the
stakeholder from pending suits at law. Cf. Sherman National Bank v. Shubert
Theatrical Co., supra note 132i where there was no express authorization of the
interpleader by Congress and yet pending state suits were enjoined (238 Fed.
at 23o).
" See NoTEs (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 461.
The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27
HAv. L. RFv. 1O7, 123, citing Todesco v. Dumont (189o, Trib. Cir. Seine) i
Clunet, 559, translated i Beale Cases on Conflict of Laws (igoo) 388.
1,, (I916, N. J. C. C.) 39 N. J. L. J. 132, Speer, 3.
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served there, or in Connecticut, because the wife could not be compelled
to appear. Federal interpleader was pronounced impossible for juris-
dictional reasons.Y41 The bank, though made a party to the New Jersey
suit and notified, refused to come in. After negotiations for settle-
ment between the wife and the bank, a friendly suit between them was
instituted in Connecticut, to which the insurance company was not to
be made a party, and it was agreed that the New Jersey action should
meanwhile be stayed. The Connecticut court decided in favor of the
wife, and ordered the transfer of the policies to her. She returned
to New Jersey and collected the policies in her suit there against the
company, which was fully protected against the bank's 'claim by the
Connecticut decision inasmuch as the agreement between the claimants
made that decision the final determination of the contest between them.
Of course, this solution was made possible in the particular case by
the wife's willingness to sue in Connecticut. If she had refused,
would it not be practicable to reach the same result through an order
from the New Jersey courts, telling her to sue in Connecticut? The
proceeding that I suggest would operate as follows: The company files
a bill against the wife in New Jersey, setting forth the double vexation
from her claim and that of the non-resident bank, which however is
not made a party. The court decides that the hardship on the company
outweighs the wife's objections to appearance in Connecticut, and
orders her to sue the bank there, while the company pays the insurance
into the New Jersey court to await the outcome of the Connecticut
suit. This closes the first stage of this bi-state interpleader. The
second stage takes place in a Connecticut court. The wife sues
the bank, which is enjoined from bringing any action against the insur-
ance company in view of the payment into the New Jersey court. Con-
necticut now has personal jurisdiction over both claimants, and closes
the second stage by a declaratory judgment in favor of one claimant,
1 42
who takes the res out of the New Jersey court. The whole proceeding
is just like ordinary interpleader, except that each stage is in a different
state. Inasmuch as each court made personal service on the person
who was defendant in the precise contest in that court, the joint effect
of the judgments of both courts binds all the parties everywhere.
If the New Jersey court considered that the wife ought not to be
forced to sue in Connecticut, the compaiy could institute a similar
proceeding in Connecticut against the bank, to have it ordered to sue the
wife in New Jersey. Of course, it is possible that each state might
'= This suit was before the Federal Insurance Interpleader Act of 1917.
' Borchard, The Declaratory Judgmet-A Needed Procedural Reform (1918)
28 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, Io5, shows the advantages of such judgments, now per-
mitted by statute in many states. Even where such a judgment is not obtainable,
the second stage could sometimes be a proceeding for actual relief, and not merely
for a declaration. The Conn. judgment in Hills v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra
note x4o, was not declaratory.
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refuse to send its local claimant into a foreign court. All hope of
equitable relief would then be ended, but there would be enough chance
that one court or the other would make such an order for the sake of
avoiding double vexation, that it would be well worth while for an
insurance company or other stake-holder to try the remedy just out-
lined before falling back on the unsatisfactory last resort of defending
two actions at law, in each of which the plaintiff has a sympathetic
jury and the stake-holder has to oppose him without aid from the real
adversary.
The proposed remedy of bi-state interpleader would probably neces-
sitate concurrent legislation by the two states concerned, and would
certainly be facilitated by such legislation even if not absolutely neces-
sary. Thus, Connecticut might provide that its courts should recog-
nize the orders of the courts of any other state in such proceedings, on
condition that the other state extended similar recognition to the Con-
necticut orders. This form of interstate agreement through "recipro-
cal legislation,"'143 frequently employed in automobile regulation, would
be less satisfactory than interstate treaties on interpleader under the
Constitutional provision (Art. I, sec. Io), which permits such com-
pacts with the consent of Congress. This little-used clause has sprung
into recent prominence through the Colorado River Compact,'
4 ' and
other interstate waterways such as New York Harbor and the Colum-
bia River are controlled under similar agreements. Mr. Wigmore
suggests that it would make possible the participation of the United
States in world legislation on Negotiable Instruments and other com-
mercial subjects and on Conflict of Laws.1 45  Such treaties might
remove interstate clashes on divorce, inheritance taxes, and otherwise
lower the barriers which state lines raise to prevent our nation from
being a complete economic unit. They are the best remedy for the
causes of business friction mentioned at the beginning of this article.
The present restrictions on interstate interpleader are among the
least of such evils, but their removal would benefit many and injure
nobody, so that this topic offers a good starting-point for interstate
agreements on Conflict of Laws. We are barely beginning to realize
the possibility of conscious co6peration among the states.
See Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation (IIo) 25 POL. ScI. QUART. 435.
" Seven states are parties, and all have ratified except Arizona. See Wiel, One
Aspect of the Colorado River Interstate Agreement (1923) II CALIF. L. REV. 145;
Chamberlain, Current Legislation, Legislation through Compacts Between States
With Consent of Congress Apt to Be More Satisfactory Than Reciprocal Statutes
Where Issue Is Important and Involves Mutual Sacrifices (1923) 9 Am. BAR
Assoc. JouR. 207; Corthell, The Colorado River Problem (1923) 9 Am. BAR
Assoc. JouR. 289; P. L. Olson, The Colorado River Compact (to be published).
"3 Wigmore, Problems of World-Legislation and America's Share Therein
(1917) 4 VA. L. REv. 423, 432.
